I’m teaching a class in Christian Theological Ethics as an adjunct at Alliance Theological Seminary this term.
For every class I will post a discussion question that will help frame our conversations in class. Often these questions will involve a concrete ethical problem. For the first class, however, our discussion question is a bit more theoretical. It comes from one of Plato’s dialogues and is a classic starting point for thinking about how theology — and particularly the doctrine of God — relates to “ethics.”
Plato’s dialogues are a unique form of literature. They are presented as reports of conversations between a great teacher, Socrates, and some conversation partner or partners, in this case Euthyphro. Socrates probes the assumptions of his interlocutors by asking pointed questions. In the Euthyphro dialogue, Socrates and Euthyphro are having a conversaton about goodness and justice. Socrates asks whether it is good and just for the state to punish a murderer, when the punishment results in harm to the murderer. In other words, Socrates asks why it is ethically acceptable to harm a murderer through punishment but not ethically acceptable to harm others by committing murder. Euthyhpro responds by suggesting that the gods have declared murder immoral and subject to punishment. Socrates then asks why the will of the gods should determine what is or is not good and just. Here is a key part of that discussion:
Euth. . . . I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.
Soc. Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?
Euth. We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will stand the test of enquiry.
Soc. We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
A bit later in the dialogue, Socrates frames the key question as follows:
Soc. And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
Euthyphro responds by suggesting that piety is just because it honors the gods. Socrates responds that people are pious because they are afraid of the gods, who have the power to destroy their lives, just as oxen or cattle obey a herdsman who weilds a whip:
Soc. I should not say that where there is fear there is also reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of their fear.
The discussion between Socrates and Euthyhpro then goes on to explore the relationship between piety and fear.
All of this dialogue establishes what we today call the “Euthyphro Dilemma”: Is what God commands “good” because God commands it, or does God command it because it is “good”?
If the former is true — what God commands is “good” because God commands it — then it is hard to see how the term “good” has any meangingful content. God’s commands could be entirely arbitrary. One day God might command us to love our neighbors as ourselves, and the next day he might command us to slaughter our neighbors. If we obey these arbirary commands, our obedience will arise only from fear of God’s absolute and terrible power.
We might respond, then, that God only commands that which is really “good,” even if we do not always fully understand the goodness of God’s commands. But this response suggests that God is bound by a principle higher than God’s self — some principle of “the good.” The problem here is that the definition of “God” entails absolute perfection. There can be no principle of “the good” that limits God’s commands or compels God to act, because God would then not really be “God.” There would be some principle higher or more authoritative than “God,” which in a sense would itself by “God.”
In both popular and academic literature, sermons, and so-on, you will often hear statements about morality and ethics that impale themselves on one or the other of the horns of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Why did God command the Israelites to destroy the Canaanites? A common response is along these lines: “Who are we to question God’s commands — God can do whatever He wants.” This kind of response makes God’s commands utterly arbitrary and destroys any objective concept of “the good.” Alternatively, we might suggest that the Biblical witness concerning these commands is untrustworthy and perhaps should be edited out of our Bibles: “God would never command His people to do something unjust.” This kind of response seems to suggest a standard of “justice” that sits in judgment over God Himself.
The readings assgined for our first class point towards a way between the horns of the Euthyhpro Dilemma for Christian theological ethics. The key, as we will discuss in class, lies in a robust understanding of the doctrine of God.