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Epistemology Theology

Foundationalism and theTrinity

My post about Nancy Pearcy’s book Total Truth led to some good discussion about the limits of logic. In particular, there was some discussion about whether the doctrine of the Trinity is “logical.” To me, the doctrine of the Trinity is a severe test for any kind of foundationalism in which human reason and perception are considered basic.

It seems to me that the doctrine of the Trinity fails the test of human logic, and therefore should not be considered a legitimate belief by a foundationalist. Of course, as a Christian, I, along with most if not all of my foundationalist Evangelical friends, do believe in the doctrine of the Trinity. So what I’d like to do is explore a bit of my thinking on this, and invite my friends in the blogsphere who’ve been defending at least a “modest” foundationalism to explain how their criteria for truth square with believing the doctrine of the Trinity. (As usual, I don’t claim to know it all here, and I’m in the process of exploring these thoughts myself.)

First, a very brief explanation of my understanding of the Trinity. The Westminster Confession of Faith describes the Trinity as follows: “[i]n the unity of the Godhead there be three Persons of one substance, power, and eternity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost.” As explained in Millard Erickson’s Christian Theology, essential to the doctrine of the Trinity are the ideas of the unity of God (“God is one, not several”) and “the deity of each of the three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.” (Erickson, at p. 362.)

Erickson’s chapter on the Trinity contrasts the orthodox view with historic deviations from it, including views which stressed the unity of God over the separateness of the three persons of the Trinity (these include dynamic monarchianism, in which God is seen as dynamically present in the man Jesus, and modalistic monarchism, in which the three persons of the Trinity are not truly distinct persons but are simply “modes” of how God operates) and views which stressed the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity over the unity of God (including early Orthodox formulations stating God is one “ousia” (essence) in three “hupostaseis” (modes of being). (Erickson, at pp. 358-361.) In contrast to these views, Erickson notes that an orthodox Evangelical view of the Trinity will not empasize one aspect of the Trinity over another. According to another Evangelical theologian, Wayne Grudem (in his Systematic Theology), the doctrine can be summarized as follows: “1. God is three persons. 2. Each person is fully God. 3. There is one God.” (Grudem, at p. 231).

It seems to me that this formulation of the Trinity violates the basic rule of logic that something cannot be “x and not x.” Yet, it also seems to me that it is a correct, orthodox formulation of the doctrine. This suggest to me that human logic is limited as a test for the truthfulness of propositional claims. In fact, not only is logic’s utility limited, in this instance it is unhelpful concerning a central doctrine of our faith.

Erickson is careful to state that we should not conclude that the doctrine of the Trinity is merely paradoxical. However, he recognizes the point I’ve made here about this doctrine. He says

“It appears that Tertullian was right in affirming that the doctrine of the Trinity must be divinely revealed, not humanly constructed. It is so absurd from a human standpoint that no one would have invented it. We do not hold the doctrine of the Trinity because it is self-evident or logically cogent. We hold it because God has revealed that this is what he is like.”

So I’d like to hear from my “modest foundationalist” friends: how do Christians with foundationalist epistemology justify their belief in the Trinity?

I can anticipate one answer: because reason tells us scripture is true, and scripture at least implies the doctrine of the Trinity. That reasoning seems circular to me. If reason supports scripture, it must be at least partly because scripture makes logical claims; we can’t conclude a proposition is supported based on the reasonableness of scripture if the proposition in question is illogical.

My take, at least for now, is that belief in the doctrine of the Trinity makes more sense from a non-foundationalist perspective. We believe it because we presuppose the truthfulness of scripture, because it coheres with our other well justified beliefs, and because our faith community supports the belief. It’s part of our web of beliefs and makes sense in that context.

4 replies on “Foundationalism and theTrinity”

David – thanks for inviting me to comment – I hope all is well with you. I agree with you 100% in this post – it might be for different reasons, but I agree wholeheartedly. Don’t forget, I’m a VanTillian, and as such I am against rationalism. I believe there is such a thing as logic, but logic is founded in the character of God, i.e. something is logical (rational, reasonable) insofar as it corresponds to and/or reflects the mind of God, not insofar as it reflects Aristotelianism or some other form of human logic. For instance I believe in the law of non-contradiction, but I don’t believe it is an absolute, only God is absolute. The law of non-contradiction derives from God’s character as a non-contradictory God. However, because we are finite and God is infinite, because we are sinful and He is holy, and because we now see through a glass darkly 😉 we can never see all of the potential logical connections between things. There may be things that seem contradictory to us using our own finite (Arisotelian) powers of reasoning and logic, yet they are not contradictory to God.
I’ve made the same argument you have before and had all kinds of challenges where people have jumped through all kinds of hoops to prove that the Trinity does not violate the law of non-contradiction but none of them have satisfied me. I think you are absolutely correct – Aristotelianism can not give a full accounting of the Trinity, but that doesn’t mean it is an illogical or irrational doctrine – it simply means that our logic and rationality are too finite to be able to comprehend it.
On the whole foundationalism thing I have to apologize that I have not read some of the books you have recommended, but from some of the things you said before I think we may be talking apples and oranges in our disagreements on this matter. I would not be a foundationalist in a Cartesian “I think therefore I am” sense or in the sense that there is some abstract principle out there which forms the foundation for all of my thought. I see God and His revelation to us as foundational.
And by the way, since I haven’t read the books you recommended and my only exposure to foundationalism proper was in one or two class sessions in an intro to philosophy course, I realize I may be missing the boat totally in this talk of foundationalism.

David – RC Sproul, in Defending The Faith, devotes an entire chapter (chapter 5, Contradictions, Paradox, Mystery) to the issue raised in your post … using the historic doctrine of the Trinity.

God is one in A (essence) and three in B (person). No violation of logic. Orthodoxy asserts that God, with respect to one thing, is unified, but with respect to another he has diversity or plurality.

A contradiction would occur if we said that God was one in essence (A) and three in essence (non-A), or one in person (B) and three in person (non-B).

What we have with the Trinity is a paradox – an appearance of contradiction.

With the Trinity, we are unable to penetrate the depths of what it is. It is a mystery. The fact that something is mysterious does not invalidate its truthfulness. If it did, the study of science would collapse.

The thing that contradictions and mystery have in common is that they are not understood at present. The important difference, however, is that contradictions can never be understood. Not even God can understand a contradiction.

Mystery is a legitimate element of reality, a legitimate part of pursuing knowledge, and should provoke a response of humility within us. But mysteries should not be used to embrace contradictions.

Biblical revelation is undermined once contradiction is embraced as truth. The Bible presupposes logic … if it didn’t, then Christ could be anti-Christ at the same time and in the same way. The Bible would be unintelligble if logic were not presupposed.

The limits you speak of in your post are in our knowledge … not in logic … for rationality and logic, as David Wayne said, are grounded in the character of God.

Rationalism, which I condemn along with David W., goes too far with the rationality gig. It puts man’s reasoning as the ultimate authority. Man’s reasoning is not the rule and authority in life … God’s revelation is. On that, we all agree.

Thanks for the interesting discussion!

Thanks for the comments guys. Jeff — in saying God is one in “essence” but three in person, aren’t you sort of adopting the Orthodox (capital “O”) one “ousia” in three “hupostaseis” formulation, and doesn’t that weaken the doctrine that God is one God? Regardless, how does the presence of this mystery relate to your soft foundationalist epistemology? If you say that some mysteries are beyond any human reason, wouldn’t that suggest that an epistemology with human perception and reason at its base is suspect, even if it demands less certitude than “hard” Cartesian foundationalism? Or are you saying that human beings would be able to comprehend the Trinity if they possessed all the facts (which would imply that human beings are or in a sinless state could be capable of perceiving all the relevant facts)?

Thanks again for the thoughtful responses.

David O.

Other than your post, I am not familiar with the “ousia” / “hupostaseis” view of the Trinity … so I guess I cannot really answer your first question. I consider my trinitarian view to be orthodox as in classical Christianity. I don’t consider the classical Christian view to emphasize one attribute of the Trinity over and against other attributes of the Trinity. I still consider myself a monotheist, for example.

I think reason and revelation both have to play a part in our epistemology … it is unavoidable. Where I think rationalism (which is what I assume you mean by “hard” foundationalism) is dead wrong in that man’s reason is the *only* authority. That is obviously man-centered thinking and should be rejected.

Here is my position … we can have limits in our knowledge without assuming that logic breaks down. It is a non-sequiter, in my opinion, to say that because our knowledge of God is limited to his “communicable” attributes, that logic therefore fails and should be rejected. It does not follow.

The limits are in knowledge … not logic/reason.

I don’t want to throw out the baby with the bath water, and resort to coherentism as my only test of truth. For one, I think is unlivable to do so.

Some level of logic/reason must be assumed as we approach God’s revelation … otherwise, the revelation will be completely unintelligible. How could we even read it … decipher the words and meaning … and apply it, if the law of non-contradiction were not assumed?

I have never had a revelational fideist ever give me a good response to that question. Unless God chooses to implant his revelation directly into our minds, I don’t see how we can throw logic and propositional truth completely out the window. Why would God even chose to use a book? Why not just the Holy Spirit?

I have rambled a bit here … and I apologize if I did not answer your question directly. I don’t think I will ever fully *get* the Trinity … and know it in exactly the same way as God knows it … even in a glorified state. There is a creator/creature divide that will leave gaps in my knowledge.

If I missed the thrust of your question, try again and I will see if I can do better 🙂

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