There’s a good little discussion brewing at Dawn Treader about applied ethics and Natural Law. One of the commenters feels that the Judeo-Christian approach to ethics — which he describes as “‘Because God Says So'” — is unsatisfying. This reflects, I think, a common misconception about how Christians derive ethical beliefs. Here’s how I continued the conversation.
Well, I would agree that “because God says so” would be unsatisfying. However, that’s not the Judeo-Christian answer. It’s a poor charicature of the Judeo-Christian answer that someone like Richard Dawkins might draw.
The Judeo-Christian answer ultimately is ontological: “because that’s who God is.” God doesn’t “say so” arbitrarily. He is, and what He says regarding the moral law — as well as what we intuitively know about it — ultimately flows from His nature and character. Goodness, justice, love, beauty, and truth are present perfectly in God’s nature and character. They are present also in His creation, and are known at least dimly in every person’s deepest being, because all of creation must reflect God’s nature and character.
When God speaks the moral law into propositions, particularly in scripture, He does so consistent with His eternally preexisting character and nature, and therefore also consistent with the Natural Law that was present from the beginning of creation. Scripture doesn’t create the moral rules; it simply makes some of the moral rules more clear to us.
As to the naturalistic narrative of ethical development, I don’t think it’s satisfying because it doesn’t answer any of the hard questions we’re asking. In particular, though it might tell us “How” we’ve come to feel certain things are right or wrong, it doesn’t tell us “Why” we should or shouldn’t act on those feelings. It isn’t in any way normative, and therefore can’t support any system of law, norms, or culture. (For a more detailed and erudite discussion of this, I’d direct you to Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life, by Oxford theologian and molecular biologist Alister McGrath. Incidentally, McGrath believes, as I do at least to a certain extent, that God used an evolutionary process that can be described in naturalistic terms to imprint on our brains and emotions certain aspects of the moral law.)
In my view, then, when properly understood, the Judeo-Christian concept of Natural Law provides rich ground for a deep and robust ethic based in the ontological reality of God. I don’t see that the secular alternatives, which principally are variants of utilitarianism, offer anything comparable.
15 replies on “Genes and Natural Law”
Interesting topic.
I honestly don’t see any real difference between ‘God says so’ and ‘that’s who God is’. How can you characterize God’s being as perfect justice, goodness, beauty, etc., unless you have some standard by which to judge Her? And if you have a standard, then why does it need to come from some supernatural being?
I think what is really important is to get people to realize that they are ultimately responsible for their moral beliefs. Even if they derive their moral system from some imagined God, they are responsible for the type of God they imagine.
It is usually rather difficult for people to change their moral beliefs. Believing that your moral system is derived from some perfect God, makes it even harder to be open to change. And although it is good that we don’t change our moral opinions on the slightest pretext, it is also not good to make it almost impossible to change them: that is a real problem with a God-given morality.
I can see that. Now if you’ll excuse me, I have to go banish my wife from our village, as she’s currently menstruating. 🙂
Ahab — by what standard could you judge God? And if there is a standard higher than God, by what standard do you judge that standard? And then by what standard would you judge the standard that judged your first standard? One of the attractive points of Natural Law theory, I think, is that it avoids, or rather answers, this kind of infinite regress. Somewhere there is a perfect standard by which all other standards are judged and which is not itself judged by any other standard. To the Platonist, that was the “forms.” In Christian Natural Law theory, that standard is the nature and character of God. This also underlies Anselm’s “ontological argument” for the existence of God and the notion of God as the “unmoved mover.”
As to the difference between “because God says so” and “because that’s how God is,” the problem with a “divine command theory” of ethics (God says so) is that you can say “but on what basis does He say that?” “Says so” by itself isn’t grounded in any ontological reality and leads once again to the problem of infinite regress or to a God who makes arbitrary rules (Euthyphro’s Dilemma). “Is,” in contrast, is an ontological question. This is the way things are, just as an apple is an apple or you are you. It requires no higher standard and no arbitrary commands.
Tom — hardy har har. You’re confusing the moral law with the civil law given to ancient Israel. The moral law is grounded in Natural Law and God’s character and is transcendent of time and culture. The civil law in the OT was given to Israel for specific religious and cultural purposes and is not transcendent or normative for all times and cultures. “Natural Law” doesn’t refer to the OT civil law or to any sort of “Reconstructionist” theonomy. But of course you knew I would say that. And I know you will say “how can you distinguish the ‘moral law’ from the ‘civil law'”, and which point I’ll refer to the covenantal theology reflected in the Old Testament, the development of ethical theory in Judaism, the new covenant discussed in the New Testament, the ethics of Jesus, and the millenia-old Christian tradition — and then we’ll be off to the races. 🙂
Actually, that’s not what I’m going to say next. It’s more along the lines of this:
Since today’s Christians seem far more concerned with those OT “civil” laws (witness their position on homosexuality, for example) than with the NT “moral” laws (witness their patent disregard for teachings like “judge not” and “let him who is without sin cast the first stone” and “love thy enemy” and so forth), I thought I was just playing along. 🙂
And because, by your own reasoning, we have no standard against which to judge God, we have absolutely no way of evaluating the truth or falsity of this assessment. Which puts you in a difficult pickle.
The reason “Because God” is an unsatisfying answer is that there is literally nothing that wouldn’t fit with that “reason.” Things are the way they are because God made them that way… How on Earth do you figure out if that’s true or false? Answer: You don’t. You can explain (away) literally anything with that answer.
And even if I take your “how can you distinguish” answer at face value, it essentially boils down to “with years and years of study,” meaning that there’s no simple way to distinguish the laws I’m still supposed to follow from the ones I can safely ignore.
Tom, I don’t think it takes “years of study” to distinguish the moral and civil law in most cases. Generally it’s pretty clear and well defined within the Christian tradition. Yes, there are some questions at the margins, and yes, there are fringe groups like the Reconstructionists, but on the whole the principles are pretty clear. (I don’t, BTW, think homosexuality is merely part of the civil law; with the majority of the historic Christian tradition, I think a sexual ethic that restricts intercourse to a man and a woman in marriage is part of the moral law).
For similar reasons, I don’t think “because God” is the catch-all answer you make it out to be, or that it’s in any way difficult to evaluating the propriety of this basis for ethics. We have scripture and millenia of tradition and practice that help us understand what comports with God’s character and what doesn’t. We have a robust theology of God and a deep concept of anthropology that gives us confidence in the propriety of grounding ethics in God’s character. It’s as consistent and coherent an ethical system as any other you can think of. Whether it’s ultimately right or wrong might be a matter beyond “proof” in the sense of being indubitable, but I don’t think it’s fair to characterize Christian / Natural Law ethics as essentially nonsensical.
Ahab — by what standard could you judge God?.
By the standard I use to judge anyone’s behavior.
And if there is a standard higher than God, by what standard do you judge that standard?
I don’t know what you mean by a standard higher than God. Moral standards aren’t higher or lower than any being. They are what I try to live and the way I expect others to live.
And then by what standard would you judge the standard that judged your first standard? One of the attractive points of Natural Law theory, I think, is that it avoids, or rather answers, this kind of infinite regress..
Well, I haven’t taken the first step down that path, so I don’t see that I need be unduly worried about an infinite regress. I don’t get why you think a moral standard is meant to judge other moral standards. From my perspective, it is meant to judge people’s behavior.
Somewhere there is a perfect standard by which all other standards are judged and which is not itself judged by any other standard.
I’m sorry, but I think the idea of a “perfect standard” is purely imaginary.
To the Platonist, that was the “forms.” In Christian Natural Law theory, that standard is the nature and character of God. This also underlies Anselm’s “ontological argument” for the existence of God and the notion of God as the “unmoved mover.”
Well, I’m not a platonist. And I think moral standards are abstract concepts by which we judge behavior. I believe it a mistake to reify abstract concepts by positing that they exist in some sort of platonic realm.
As to the difference between “because God says so” and “because that’s how God is,” the problem with a “divine command theory” of ethics (God says so) is that you can say “but on what basis does He say that?” “Says so” by itself isn’t grounded in any ontological reality and leads once again to the problem of infinite regress or to a God who makes arbitrary rules (Euthyphro’s Dilemma). “Is,” in contrast, is an ontological question. This is the way things are, just as an apple is an apple or you are you. It requires no higher standard and no arbitrary commands.
If you are allowed to say that God behaves a certain way because that is just the way things are, I don’t see why I shouldn’t be allowed the counterclaim that we attempt to act morally because that is just the way things are. Plus, my view has the advantage of being more parsimonious than yours.
Based on your response, I think we have such different outlooks on the way the world is constructed, it is extremely unlikely we will find much agreement here. But it would be ok if we just come to a better understanding of the other’s position.:-)
Thanks for the further comments, Ahab. A few more thoughts:
Plus, my view has the advantage of being more parsimonious than yours.
I don’t think that’s so at all. In your view, why do we “attempt to act morally because that’s the way things are?” Why are things the way they are? Why do human beings have minds that allow us to make moral judgments and what is the nature of the mind? You can start to provide answers to those questions, but it gets pretty complicated without God. I don’t see the parsimony there. If anything, the “God” answer is simpler.
They are what I try to live and the way I expect others to live. [snip] I don’t get why you think a moral standard is meant to judge other moral standards. From my perspective, it is meant to judge people’s behavior.
I think you need a basis for judging a moral theory precisely because we use moral theory to compel other people to behave a certain way and to judge their conduct. Let’s say you believe it’s immoral for me to steal your property. Why should I be compelled to accept your moral understanding on this point? Why should my freedom be circumscribed by your moral beliefs? Absent a foundation for moral beliefs, such beliefs don’t provide any basis upon which to formulate laws or order society. Law and morality then become, as Mao put it, nothing more than the point of a gun.
Now, you might say that law and morality are indeed ultimately nothing more than the point of a gun. But we don’t think and live and feel that way in the real world, do we? Today our national leaders attended Corretta Scott King’s funeral and remembered the civil rights struggle she and her husband waged. Why do we celebrate that struggle if if the slave owners and segregationists were merely maximizing their own utility at the point of the gun? Because we know that the point of the gun isn’t really the right answer. We know there is something more that provides an authoritative basis for law and civil society. You might think the notion of a higher law is illusory, but I think the notion of civil society without a higher law is what’s really illusory.
I don’t think that’s so at all. In your view, why do we “attempt to act morally because that’s the way things are?” Why are things the way they are? Why do human beings have minds that allow us to make moral judgments and what is the nature of the mind? You can start to provide answers to those questions, but it gets pretty complicated without God. I don’t see the parsimony there. If anything, the “God” answer is simpler.
Not really. The only explanation you provided above for God was “that is just the way it is”. If you are going to postulate that, I can postulate that we act morally simply because that is the way it is. I don’t have to add God into the picture at all. That is what I meant by my explanation being more parismonious.
I think you need a basis for judging a moral theory precisely because we use moral theory to compel other people to behave a certain way and to judge their conduct. Let’s say you believe it’s immoral for me to steal your property. Why should I be compelled to accept your moral understanding on this point?
You aren’t compelled to accept my moral understanding regarding stealing. You are free to believe it is moral to steal. Problem is you live in a society where the vast majority of people believe it is wrong to steal. So if you steal and get caught you will be punished. Even in jail you are free to continue to believe that you were morally justified in your actions.
Enforcing our moral standards with laws and prisons does not negate or lesson our morality.
I would agree that the civil rights movement and Mrs. King’s role in that movement were great moral victories. But they would have been in vain if she and those in the movement did not persuade the rest of society of the rightness of that cause. And because of that victory, force has been and will continue to be used to punish those who discriminate against people on the basis of race.
The only explanation you provided above for God was “that is just the way it is”. If you are going to postulate that, I can postulate that we act morally simply because that is the way it is. I don’t have to add God into the picture at all. That is what I meant by my explanation being more parismonious.
No, that’s not exactly what I said. I said the ultimate basis of morality is grounded in the ontological status of God. We intuit and feel certain things about morality / the Natural Law because we are made in God’s image and because all of creation reflects God’s character. That “because” — why do we intuit and feel certain things about morality — is what I think your position is missing. Missing information isn’t parsimony; it’s just missing information.
So if you steal and get caught you will be punished. Even in jail you are free to continue to believe that you were morally justified in your actions.
Enforcing our moral standards with laws and prisons does not negate or lesson our morality.
Right, but the question I’m asking is why is society justified in using that kind of force? Separate the use of the force from the reason for the use of the force. It’s the reason I’m after.
Perhaps the quest for reasons is merely academic. Like you said, I’d end up in jail regardless of whether the reasons for the state’s use of force are right or wrong. But these are ideas with very immediate consequences. Ask people in China and North Vietnam who are suffering under dictatorships; ask the hundreds of millions who were tortured and killed under Soviet communism; ask the victims of the Holocaust; ask the countless multitudes who’ve languished under tyranny. This question of reasons goes to the heart of the freedoms we value most.
But they would have been in vain if she and those in the movement did not persuade the rest of society of the rightness of that cause.
Exactly! How did that persuasion happen? Through appeals to a concept of transcendent human dignity that was grounded in Natural Law theology. Because there’s a lot to this, I want to continue this dicussion in a separate thread. I hope you’ll continue to join in there.
Right, but the question I’m asking is why is society justified in using that kind of force? Separate the use of the force from the reason for the use of the force. It’s the reason I’m after.
Society is justified because it either thinks it is good for the members of the society or that it is the moral thing to do.
In other words it believes it is moral to prevent someone form stealing other’s property. I don’t understand why you think the employment of force negates the moral impulse that the members of society are acting upon.
You seem to be positing that because this impulse comes from a transcendent being and not from the beings making up society that this somehow makes the morality valid. Am I understanding you correctly here?
Perhaps the quest for reasons is merely academic. Like you said, I’d end up in jail regardless of whether the reasons for the state’s use of force are right or wrong. But these are ideas with very immediate consequences. Ask people in China and North Vietnam who are suffering under dictatorships; ask the hundreds of millions who were tortured and killed under Soviet communism; ask the victims of the Holocaust; ask the countless multitudes who’ve languished under tyranny. This question of reasons goes to the heart of the freedoms we value most.
Ask the people who were jailed in the civil right movement. People have legitimate differences over what is moral. If someone holds to a moral position they are most likely going to face some consequences from that society.
We use force to ensure people obey the civil rights laws. That doesn’t negate the fact that we believe those laws are morally acceptable.
Exactly! How did that persuasion happen? Through appeals to a concept of transcendent human dignity that was grounded in Natural Law theology.
It happened through education, demonstrations and court and legislative battles. You are right that appeals to transcendent human dignity were made, but they were made by people on both sides of the issue. Many of those opposing the civil rights movement truly believed they had God on their side.
You may be right that morality is ultimately grounded in some transcendent being. But it seems as reasonable, if not more so, to me to ground it in human beings and their evolutionary development. We can trace the precursors of morality in the social systems of animals. I don’t know how you could begin to do the same for some transcendently based moral system.
Thanks for the interesting discussion. Giving me a lot to think about.
No, that’s not exactly what I said. I said the ultimate basis of morality is grounded in the ontological status of God. We intuit and feel certain things about morality / the Natural Law because we are made in God’s image and because all of creation reflects God’s character. That “because” — why do we intuit and feel certain things about morality — is what I think your position is missing. Missing information isn’t parsimony; it’s just missing information.
But I didn’t see you give any reason for why God is the way He is, other than saying “because.” I’m guessing or assuming you think that God is a necessary being and that explains it.
If that is your position, then I think it more likely that the necessary being is not God but matter.
Also, we have moral feelings because of our particular evolutionary development. Not all of the universe seems to share that moral impulse, so I don’t know how you could justify your claim that ‘all of creation reflects God’s character.’
Ahab — I have some thoughts on these recent comments, but I have to teach today, so I might not get to it for a day or so. Also meanwhile check out the new thread on MLK’s natural law theory. Thanks.
David:
I don’t really think that’s what I was saying; I was merely saying that they’re not inherently superior to any other ethics, and that it’s a bit disingenuous to refer to “Christian / Natural Law ethics” as if it’s one discrete thing, when in fact it encompasses a wide range of ethical ideas, often with marked disagreement. That God is the source of morality and Jesus is the savior seems to be about the only common thread. Otherwise, you’ll find Christians using the scripture and their “Christian worldview” to argue for and against just about anything.
As to homosexuality and the moral law, I don’t really think it’s such a slam-dunk case. It certainly wasn’t an issue for Jesus, and there are questions concerning the accuracy of translation of Paul’s sparse remarks against it.
I should add, I was pointing out that “Because God” doesn’t really explain anything. That, in and of itself, doesn’t make the Christian ethic nonsensical; it only makes that explanation of the basis for the Christian ethic insufficient.