In comments to a prior post on Natural Law, Ahab stated
You may be right that morality is ultimately grounded in some transcendent being. But it seems as reasonable, if not more so, to me to ground it in human beings and their evolutionary development. We can trace the precursors of morality in the social systems of animals. I don’t know how you could begin to do the same for some transcendently based moral system. . . . But I didn’t see you give any reason for why God is the way He is, other than saying “because.” I’m guessing or assuming you think that God is a necessary being and that explains it.
If that is your position, then I think it more likely that the necessary being is not God but matter.
These are excellent points, and I wanted to move them up here and take a few minutes to respond.
As to the evolution of moral inclinations, I’m not so sure, as an empirical matter, that an evolutionary pathway for morality is all that reasonable. The nature of the mind is hotly contested and little understood in biological science. It’s not clear that biology entirely determines the mind. Many mainstream (i.e., non-creationist) biologists hold that even if sentience is an evolutionary development, once sentience is achieved, the further development of the mind cannot be explained in evolutionary terms, since that development is directed by minds and not only by natural selection acting on random mutations. Thus, the concept of “evolution” is probably something of a misnomer as applied to morality and social interaction.
Moreover, even if all or part of the moral sense could be accounted for in evolutionary terms, that would not answer the question of transcendence. Natural Law posits that God built the moral law into creation as a necessary extension of His character. Evolution occurs according to the physical laws God also built into the universe. There is nothing inconsistent with Natural Law theory in saying that God built into the universe the conditions necessary for our moral evolution and subsequently directed the course of evolution so that we would develop into morally aware creatures. “Evolution,” then, might provide a mechanism for the physiology that supports the moral sense (and even that is debateable), but it doesn’t answer the deeper questions Natural Law theorists ask.
As to tracing the “precursors” of transcendently based moral system and the reasons why “God is the way He is,” the answer that God is a “necessary being” is part of it. It is true that Natural Law theory must stop at God. God is, indeed, the point at which we say “just because.” But that to me is a significant part of the argument’s appeal. Aristotle’s concept of the “unmoved mover,” as adopted by Acquinas, holds great appeal and logical force.
Some will object that the unmoved mover is no explanation at all because we cannot explain where the unmoved mover came from or why he/it is as he/it is. But that response misses the point. Logic suggests that causation is not infinte; something is the uncaused cause. The concept of God as an uncaused cause, a being beyond which no greater being can be conceived, at least rescues us from the infinte regress of causation. I don’t think this “ontological argument” offers an empirical “proof” of God, but I do think it supports a coherent and rational narrative.
The alternative of an infinte regress of causes seems like less of an explanation, not a more reasonable one. I can’t see how “matter” could provide an equally satisfying answer, since something must have caused “matter” to exist. Indeed, big bang cosmology says matter came into existence after the big bang; there is no satisfying explanation for the “singularity” that existed before then. String theory — again highly speculative and controversial — suggests a cyclical view of big bangs and universe creations beyond the singularity, but that continues to beg the question of first causes. Moreover, “matter” implies no teleology, while the history of life does seem to suggest a purposefulness (even apart from any particular “intelligent design” arguments).
25 replies on “More on Natural Law and Transcendence”
David,
Just to let you know I’ve seen your excellent post. May take me a day or two to get back to you. There’s some other business I need to take care of first.
Also, want to give it the attention it deserves.
Thanks.
Sounds good Ahab — looking forward to it!
David,
This is a rather vast subject(s) that we are trying to address in a very limited space here. But I’ll throw out a few thoughts, although I won’t be able to provide much detailed reasoning to support them. I’ve also tossed a few questions your way in the hope of being able to understand your position better. Of course, I also recognize that you face the same limitations I do in providing a detailed rational for your position.
“These are excellent points, and I wanted to move them up here and take a few minutes to respond.
As to the evolution of moral inclinations, I’m not so sure, as an empirical matter, that an evolutionary pathway for morality is all that reasonable. The nature of the mind is hotly contested and little understood in biological science.”
The brain is the organ that humans think with. It’s hard for me to see how one could make a case that it didn’t develop according to evolutionary forces, just like all our other organs. You could, I suppose, claim that God supernaturally guided the development of the brain, but then you’ve thrown empirical evidence completely to the side by doing so.
At that point you would then have no basis to complain about the lack of empirical evidence for an evolutionary pathway for that morality-making organ, the brain.
“It’s not clear that biology entirely determines the mind.”
Perhaps minds can exist without brains. But I’ve never yet met a human mind that didn’t depend on the human brain. Even a dualist who believes it is possible for the human mind to exist without the brain is going to have to accommodate his view to the empirical data that the only known way for the mind to do anything is through the brain.
I tend to look at biology as enabling moreso than determining. It is because of our neurological development that we are enabled to interact with the world as we do.
“Many mainstream (i.e., non-creationist) biologists hold that even if sentience is an evolutionary development, once sentience is achieved, the further development of the mind cannot be explained in evolutionary terms, since that development is directed by minds and not only by natural selection acting on random mutations. Thus, the concept of “evolution” is probably something of a misnomer as applied to morality and social interaction.”
Yes, culture has played a huge role in our development of morality. My contention would be that ultimately whatever cultural advances are made, they occur within the framework of biological evolution. It is only because physical evolution has resulted in a creature like us with the neurological equipment to dream and imagine and talk and love that we are able to have culture.
“Moreover, even if all or part of the moral sense could be accounted for in evolutionary terms, that would not answer the question of transcendence.”
From my perspective you’ve just addressed the question of trnascendence with your reference to human culture. It is that culture that is able to transcend our genetic heritage and create all the variations we see in our moral codes. Yet that culture is only possible because of our physical evolution.
” Natural Law posits that God built the moral law into creation as a necessary extension of His character.”
I’ve been trying to figure out what this means. I’m sorry but I can’t form a coherent picture of how this would be possible. What does it really mean to say that moral laws are an extesion of God’s character?
And why should one assume that these moral laws are good ones simply because they are in some infathomable way an extension of His character? What makes God a good God rather than an evil One?
It doesn’t really matter where a code of conduct comes from: whether our genes, a supernatural being or a cultural development.
Are you saying that a moral code is only good because it originates from a being that is intrinsically good? If so, how do you determine that this supposed being is good?
“Evolution occurs according to the physical laws God also built into the universe. There is nothing inconsistent with Natural Law theory in saying that God built into the universe the conditions necessary for our moral evolution and subsequently directed the course of evolution so that we would develop into morally aware creatures. “Evolution,” then, might provide a mechanism for the physiology that supports the moral sense (and even that is debateable)”
I see no inconsistency, either, with a claim that God set up the universe in such a way that the mechanism of evolution accounts for all the diversity of life on this planet. But I do find myself wondering why this God would have to tinker with the system.
“, but it doesn’t answer the deeper questions Natural Law theorists ask.”
Well, I have to say, you really have me curious now. What are the deeper questions that a Natural Law theorist might ask?
Take care,
Ahab
Ahab,
It’s hard for me to see how one could make a case that it didn’t develop according to evolutionary forces, just like all our other organs.
I wasn’t suggesting the brain didn’t develop through evolution (whether it did or didn’t maybe is a question for another day). What I’m suggesting is that the brain isn’t determinative of morality and the mind. The brain, hormones and other physical systems are the hardware that enables our minds to run. But once we exercise our wills and make conscious decisions, our development is no longer determined by natural selection acting on random mutations.
I tend to look at biology as enabling moreso than determining. It is because of our neurological development that we are enabled to interact with the world as we do.
Agreed.
My contention would be that ultimately whatever cultural advances are made, they occur within the framework of biological evolution. It is only because physical evolution has resulted in a creature like us with the neurological equipment to dream and imagine and talk and love that we are able to have culture.
Maybe so. But if we agree that biology isn’t deterministic, that people can make real moral choices, then we should agree that culture and morality are not themselves the direct products of evolution. Therefore, we can’t use evolution as any sort of norm for morality and ethics. Evolution, at best, provides an explanation of how the hardware developed to make possible our free moral and ethical choices. It doesn’t help us decide how to choose.
From my perspective you’ve just addressed the question of trnascendence with your reference to human culture.
But the fact that we’re able to make choices, and that the choices we make aren’t determined entirely by biology, doesn’t answer the question about what choices we should make. I’m looking for something that will serve as a set of norms to justify an overarching ethic. If we ground those norms in culture, it seems to me that all we’re saying is that morality is whatever people choose it to be. And that is saying the concept of morality is ephemeral and never binding. Of course, you can take that position, but it isn’t any more empirically supported than a theistic position, and I’d argue that it’s substantially less coherent.
What does it really mean to say that moral laws are an extesion of God’s character?
When I say “moral laws” here I should be more precise and say “the Natural Law.” Ultimately, things are right or wrong because of the way things are, and things are the way they are because God is who He is. It is wrong to murder, for example, because every individual possesses an inherent worth, creativity, dignity and autonomy; and every person possesses an inherent worth, creativity, dignity and autonomy ultimately because we are created in the image of God, who possesses these qualities infinitely. These are real ontological qualities that transcend time, place and culture.
What makes God a good God rather than an evil One?
This is a point, I think, at which we have to say “because that’s who He is.” God simply is. There’s no cause before Him and no measuring stick beyond Him. Within a Christian framework, however, there are evidences of God’s goodness, most notably in Christ’s incarnation and crucifiction. In the life and death of Christ, Christians see manifest, beautiful and perfect evidence of God’s goodness.
It doesn’t really matter where a code of conduct comes from: whether our genes, a supernatural being or a cultural development
I’ll disagree with you here. As we seem to have agreed, biology (genes) don’t determine codes of conduct; and I’ve argued that cultural developments don’t provide meaningful norms because they merely reflect ephemeral human choices. I do think that at the end of the day, it’s very difficult to construct a robust ethic without reference to God.
But I do find myself wondering why this God would have to tinker with the system.
I’m not sure what you mean by “tinker.” Some Christians, admittedly probably a minority of us, hold that God designed the creation in such a way that there is no evident “tinkering” with natural processes. Natural history can be described in terms of natural selection acting on random mutations, with “random” meaning “not statistically correlated,” but with the belief that God soverignly directed what we percieve as “random” so that the creation would evolve as it did. Others hold that there are evidences in natural history of particular interventions by God (or the “designer” in Intelligent Design parlance). I think ID says some interesting things, but my views about Natural Law are consistent with either ID or “theistic evolution” (the first position I described).
What are the deeper questions that a Natural Law theorist might ask?
Things like, Why ought I to behave a certain way? Why should a society adopt a particular type of government or a particular set of laws? Why can we say that something like the genocide in Rwanda was “wrong”?
Sorry for the length of this post, David. I tried to be as brief as I could. Hopefully, the brevity does not come across as rudeness or know-it-allness. Again, I appreciate how civil (and thought-provoking) you have been in this conversation.
I wasn’t suggesting the brain didn’t develop through evolution (whether it did or didn’t maybe is a question for another day). What I’m suggesting is that the brain isn’t determinative of morality and the mind. The brain, hormones and other physical systems are the hardware that enables our minds to run. But once we exercise our wills and make conscious decisions, our development is no longer determined by natural selection acting on random mutations.
Once the brain developed the capability to think and make decisions and learn, then human culture was able to thrive. But the attainment of culture doesn’t mean we are set free from the limits of the brain or from physical evolution, for that matter. Culture is now part of the environment that humans have to adapt to. Natural selection and genetic variation don’t stop simply because culture has been added to the other environmental variables.
Maybe so. But if we agree that biology isn’t deterministic, that people can make real moral choices, then we should agree that culture and morality are not themselves the direct products of evolution. Therefore, we can’t use evolution as any sort of norm for morality and ethics. Evolution, at best, provides an explanation of how the hardware developed to make possible our free moral and ethical choices. It doesn’t help us decide how to choose.
It has set the framework within which we make moral decisions. I think some of our more traditional moral codes could and will be shown to be a direct result of certain genes. For instance, there is the universal taboo against incest. A society could try and legislate widespread incestual unions, declaring them to be moral and encouraging people to marry their brothers and sisters. I don’t think such an attempt would ever succeed.
When and if we start identifying those genes which do affect our moral decisions we are going to have some very serious decisions to make. Are we going to try changing that genetic code in order to “improve” our moral system? That seems like a very deep and worrisome question to me.
Ahab:From my perspective you’ve just addressed the question of trnascendence with your reference to human culture.
David: But the fact that we’re able to make choices, and that the choices we make aren’t determined entirely by biology, doesn’t answer the question about what choices we should make. I’m looking for something that will serve as a set of norms to justify an overarching ethic.
It appears to me that you are looking for a way to say “My moral code is right and your’s is wrong. And because my moral code comes from this supernatural being who is all-powerful, that means my code and not yours should be the one we follow.”
Why should I believe that you have acces to this God’s intentions? Or even accept your claim that this supernatural being is all-good?
The Mayans could have easily applied your natural law methodology in order to support human sacrifice.
If we ground those norms in culture, it seems to me that all we’re saying is that morality is whatever people choose it to be. And that is saying the concept of morality is ephemeral and never binding. Of course, you can take that position, but it isn’t any more empirically supported than a theistic position, and I’d argue that it’s substantially less coherent.
Yes, if there is no supernatural, everlasting source from which morality flows then it is ephemeral. So? I don’t understand what temporality has to do with the judgement of good and bad.
And I don’t know how you can conclude that because it is society which chooses to enforce certain moral codes that means that morality can never be binding. The fact that society can pass laws to punish those who commit murder or rape is empirical evidence that they can be binding.
Ahab: What makes God a good God rather than an evil One?
David: This is a point, I think, at which we have to say “because that’s who He is.” God simply is. There’s no cause before Him and no measuring stick beyond Him.
Then you’ve simply turned morality into a brute fact. Your attempt to base it on a transcendental being seems to me to bear no fruit. Murder is to be avoided not because it is wrong but because that is just the way things are.
Within a Christian framework, however, there are evidences of God’s goodness, most notably in Christ’s incarnation and crucifiction. In the life and death of Christ, Christians see manifest, beautiful and perfect evidence of God’s goodness.
Christians may see it that way. To an outsider like me, the God depicted in the Bible looks like a cruel monster who seems to justify His actions by use of His power. Perhaps you are offended by this view. I’m not trying to offend you. I’m trying to help you understand why someone who doesn’t already accept this Christian worldview, would be very leery of your claims to establish a moral system based on Natural Law.
I would no sooner assume some behavior to be morally correct because it was ok’d by the Chrisitan God than I would if it was ok’d by the Mayan God.
Ahab: It doesn’t really matter where a code of conduct comes from: whether our genes, a supernatural being or a cultural development
David: I’ll disagree with you here. As we seem to have agreed, biology (genes) don’t determine codes of conduct;
Actually, I don’t think we are in agreement regarding the role of genes here. My position is a little more nuanced. I think for instance, that it is very likely we will find the genes responsible for the incest taboo. We will also most likely find the genes responsible for that part of the brain which gives us the basic moral instincts we have. That doesn’t mean that every particular moral code devoleped by mankind must be directly encoded in our genes.
Ahab: But I do find myself wondering why this God would have to tinker with the system.
David: I’m not sure what you mean by “tinker.”
To tweak. If one has to tweak a system in order to make it do what one wants, then it would seem there is some defect in the system. If God set up evolution in order to bring about the diversity of life we see on this planet, then why does He have to keep making adjustments to it in order to get the desired results? This kind of god seems less intelligent to me than one Who could setup the whole system and then not have to tweak it to get it to work properly.
Given what we so far know about the nature of this world, it would seem to me that the deistic version of God is a more reasonable one to believe in.
Some Christians, admittedly probably a minority of us, hold that God designed the creation in such a way that there is no evident “tinkering” with natural processes. Natural history can be described in terms of natural selection acting on random mutations, with “random” meaning “not statistically correlated,” but with the belief that God soverignly directed what we percieve as “random” so that the creation would evolve as it did.
So you are saying that the ‘random’ mutations that occur are a result of God’s activity? Even though many of theses mutations are going to have nasty effects on the individuals they are given to? I don’t see how this fits in with your view that this Supreme Being is all-good.
Ahab: What are the deeper questions that a Natural Law theorist might ask?
David: Things like, Why ought I to behave a certain way? Why should a society adopt a particular type of government or a particular set of laws? Why can we say that something like the genocide in Rwanda was “wrong”?
Those are all questions that an atheistic naturalist can ask. I don’t understand why you think only a natural law theist can ask them. Although it would appear from this discussion that we would not agree on the answers.:-)
Ahab — thanks, this is good stuff. It’ll take me a few days to post again — busy at work. No offense taken at all, BTW — questions concerning theodicy are important.
David,
No problem, there’s no rush on this.
Glad you didn’t take any offense. Actually, re-reading what I wrote, some of it does come off as condescending to me.:-(
Ahab
Ahab,
I think some of our more traditional moral codes could and will be shown to be a direct result of certain genes.
This I doubt. This would suggest that people could not violate those traditional moral codes, which certainly isn’t the case. Perhaps there is some genetic basis for how we feel about certain actions, and maybe in that sense we’re hard wired to be predisposed to behave in certain ways that have traditionally been described as moral. If so, that’s neither here nor there with respect to whether we should follow those impulses. You can’t confuse the “is” with the “ought.”
It appears to me that you are looking for a way to say “My moral code is right and your’s is wrong. And because my moral code comes from this supernatural being who is all-powerful, that means my code and not yours should be the one we follow.”
Not exactly. I am, however, trying to find a ground for the “ought” question. That would include a way to introspect about my own actions to determine whether I am living a “good” life, as well as a way of determining what things are good public policies that are worthy of support.
I would no sooner assume some behavior to be morally correct because it was ok’d by the Chrisitan God than I would if it was ok’d by the Mayan God.
I think this comparison misses my point. I’m not suggesting something is “ok” simply because God (the “Christian God”) commands that it is so. Using Natural Law reasoning, we have a way of comparing the Christian ethic — “love your neighbor as yourself” — with the Mayan ethic — “sacrifice your neighbor’s life to appease the gods” — and to determine which of those ethical frameworks we ought to follow. Apart from some concept of Natural Law, I don’t see a coherent, principled way of answering that “ought” question. How would you answer that question? Why is “love your neighbor” better than “human sacrifice?”
If one has to tweak a system in order to make it do what one wants, then it would seem there is some defect in the system. …. Given what we so far know about the nature of this world, it would seem to me that the deistic version of God is a more reasonable one to believe in.
There is a third possibility between the “tweaking” God of Intelligent Design theory and the Deist’s “blind watchmaker”: an all-knowing God who designs the system from its inception to develop exactly as it has, who is immanent in creation as well as transcendent over it. The work of Thomas Torrance is useful here. I don’t think the “blind watchmaker” is much of a god at all, nor do I think it’s reasonable to conclude, given facts such as the anthropic principle and evolutionary convergence, that the universe was wound up to run on its own.
As to the “tweaking” god of Intelligent Design, that’s a whole ‘nother kettle of fish, which I’m a bit exhausted of debating. The short answer is, I don’t think it’s necessarily evidence of a design flaw to build inflection points into the design at which an operator gives input to influence the further development of the design program. Video games, for example, are designed to accept user input and to produce differing output based on that input. That isn’t a design flaw, that is the design. But this doesn’t matter much to the discussion of ethics — the “tweaking” God or a sovereign, immanent God directing Darwinian evolution will do.
So you are saying that the ‘random’ mutations that occur are a result of God’s activity? Even though many of theses mutations are going to have nasty effects on the individuals they are given to? I don’t see how this fits in with your view that this Supreme Being is all-good.
In the view of theistic evolution, yes. The theodicy question you’re asking is a difficult one. It’s a difficult question even if we assume God created everything instantly as-is. Why did God create a world in which He knew there would be evil and suffering? We could write books on this and still not resolve it.
A short stab at an answer is that, with respect to human beings, God desires the ultimate good of the human beings He has created in His image; the path towards such an ultimate good requires that we be able to freely choose it; the ability to freely choose it entails the ability to reject it; and suffering in this life can ultimately produce more lasting good. With respect to the rest of creation, the issues are different because animals (and plants and microbes and such) do not possess the self-awareness of human beings, and so to speak of “suffering” outside of the human context is an anthropomorphism. For all of creation, there is a telos — an ultimate direction and end, which produces the greatest possible good, despite and perhaps because of suffering along the way.
Like I said, space and time limitations make this so pithy as to be almost trite. It’s a difficult question, but it’s just as difficult for any worldview that isn’t simply nihlistic.
I don’t understand why you think only a natural law theist can ask them. Although it would appear from this discussion that we would not agree on the answers.:-)
I didn’t mean only Natural Law can ask these questions. I’m suggesting that Natural Law is the only reasonable and coherent way to begin answering them. So far, if I understand you right, you ground the answers in evolution — “we tend to behave certain ways because of our genes.” I see that as a factual description, not an ethical imperative. From where do you get the ethical imperative?
Christians may see it that way. To an outsider like me, the God depicted in the Bible looks like a cruel monster who seems to justify His actions by use of His power.
I realize I missed this one. There certainly are events in the history of Israel as recorded in the Old Testament that seem harsh to our ears. We can talk about those, but my focus was specifically on Christ. For Christians, Christ is God’s ultimate revelation of Himself to us. We view everything we think about God through what we believe He did in Christ. What in the life, teaching, or death of Christ seems cruel or monstrous to you?
David, thanks for the informative response. Just want to give a quick response right now to one of your comments.
I think this comparison misses my point. I’m not suggesting something is “ok” simply because God (the “Christian God”) commands that it is so.
I understood you to be saying that something is right because it is somehow part of God’s intrinsic character, not because He commands it. But as far as I can see this simply moves the dilemma you are trying to address here one step further back. I don’t see the move resolving the dilemma.
Why should I assume God’s character is morally good? If you fall back on the claim that it is simply becuse that’s the way He is, I see no difference from a claim that we try to behave morally because that is simply the way we are. No need then to call on this transcendental realm in order to resolve a moral issue.
Using Natural Law reasoning, we have a way of comparing the Christian ethic — “love your neighbor as yourself” — with the Mayan ethic — “sacrifice your neighbor’s life to appease the gods” — and to determine which of those ethical frameworks we ought to follow.
Maybe it would be helpful to elaborate on this. If a Mayan and a Christian sit down and try to hash this out, how do you think it is going to be resolved?
Both claim to draw their moral code from the transcendental realm. How do they determine which code should be followed?
I realize I missed this one. There certainly are events in the history of Israel as recorded in the Old Testament that seem harsh to our ears. We can talk about those, but my focus was specifically on Christ. For Christians, Christ is God’s ultimate revelation of Himself to us. We view everything we think about God through what we believe He did in Christ. What in the life, teaching, or death of Christ seems cruel or monstrous to you?
A god who requires human sacrifice in order to atone for human sin’s seems rather monstrous to me.
I don’t find a lot to admire in the teachings of Jesus. I believe the love your neighbor as yourself ideaa was already to be found in the Old Testament, so it is not a teaching unique to him.
Of course it can be quite difficult to even know what Jesus actually taught. The Jesus in Mark seems very different than the one portrayed by John. And Matthew’s Jesus has him adhereing quite closely to the Old Testament Jewish Law (not one jot or tittle of it will pass away?) which most Christians have been quite content to discard.
The one teachhing of His that I do find appealing: his response to the woman caught in adultery is now known not to be part of the original biblical texts. It was added much later to the manuscripts we have.
For one who is not already committed to the Jesus tradition through faith, trying to use his teachings in order to establish a framework for a moral system does not look all that attractive. Are there some specific teachings of His that differ from what can be found in other ethical traditions that you find compelling?
David,
In looking over your response here, I’m wondering if we aren’t trying to answer different questions. If so, we are probably talking past each other, at least to a certain extent.
Let me try and briefly clarify where I am coming from and also my impression of where you are coming from.
When I talk about evolutionary development and the role genetics and the brain play in morality, I am basically concerned about the how of morality. How it is possible that we have the moral urges we do and how we are able to interact with those urges. I’m not, or I don’t think I am, trying to use evolution or genes to justify a particular moral position.
I have the impression that you are trying to find a justification for any particular moral position a person may hold. It is really irrelevant to you whether or not a person has to use a flawed instrument like the brain to try and arrive at a moral judgment. Rather, your focus is on the moral judgement itself: is there a way to determine that any particular moral stance really is the correct moral stance?
Does any of the above make any sense? Or have I misinterpreted what you are trying to do here?
Ahab, scattered responses:
If a Mayan and a Christian sit down and try to hash this out, how do you think it is going to be resolved? Both claim to draw their moral code from the transcendental realm. How do they determine which code should be followed?
I doubt they would resolve it between themselves. The better question is, for example, why ought a society choose a policy of treating prisoners of war with dignity rather than a policy of sacrificing them to the gods? Is the answer to this merely culturally conditioned — meaning there is no rational basis for choosing one policy over the other — or is there some basis upon which reasonable people can make a “right” or “moral” choice between these policy alternatives? Natural Law theory proposes that human reason and intuition can serve as meaningful guides between these alternatives because human reason and intution ultimately derive from and have access to a measuring standard (in the Christian view of Natural Law, God) that is outside of our culturally conditioned selves.
Why should I assume God’s character is morally good? If you fall back on the claim that it is simply becuse that’s the way He is, I see no difference from a claim that we try to behave morally because that is simply the way we are. No need then to call on this transcendental realm in order to resolve a moral issue.
There is an ontological issue here. I don’t think there’s any comparison between the grounds of human behavior and the grounds of God’s behavior. We know we are not ultimate beings. We come into existence at a point in time and pass away at a point in time, and no human being possesses any quality in infinite measure. The very fact that we can measure our own conduct, and that we often fall short in such measurements, shows this.
By definition, in contrast, God is ultimate and He possesses qualities like goodness infinitely. A being that is not perfectly good is not God, definitionally. Perhaps there is no such being and thus there is no God, but that’s not the question we’re addressing just now. (A very powerful are even infinitely powerful being that is not also infinitely good, by definition, might be a “god,” but would not be “God”.)
I’m not sure there’s a great analogy for this, but think of the smallest elements of matter. I suppose at one time these were protons, neutrons, and electrons, but I guess now they’re quarks and leptons. What is a quark or a lepton? It is what it is. By definition, it is the smallest element of matter. It cannot be defined or characterized in any other way.
A god who requires human sacrifice in order to atone for human sin’s seems rather monstrous to me…..I don’t find a lot to admire in the teachings of Jesus.
I’m afraid your concept of the atonement is light years away from a Christian understanding of it. In the Christian faith Jesus is God incarnate, so it is not a question of requiring human sacrifice — it is a self-sacrifice. I suppose if you start from the presupposition of tossing out all Christian teaching and belief about Jesus, you can make statements like these. They’re hardly objective or fair, however.
Are there some specific teachings of His that differ from what can be found in other ethical traditions that you find compelling?
It is not merely his teachings, though those are important, but also the incarnation, the kenosis, and the atonement, and everything they imply about God’s character.
Of course it can be quite difficult to even know what Jesus actually taught. …. his response to the woman caught in adultery is now known not to be part of the original biblical texts.
To be blunt: stuff and nonsense. The NT documents, though written from different perspectives, have a significant degree of integrity concerning the historicity of Jesus. Recent critical efforts like the Jesus Seminar have been largely arbitrary, ideologically driven, and unscientific. But again, we could write books about those kinds of debates.
It is really irrelevant to you whether or not a person has to use a flawed instrument like the brain to try and arrive at a moral judgment. Rather, your focus is on the moral judgement itself: is there a way to determine that any particular moral stance really is the correct moral stance?
That’s pretty much correct. What are the grounds on which society is justified in compelling individuals to obey the law? What is “true” or “good” law?
“I doubt they would resolve it between themselves.”
That is a major reason why I find this notion of trying to base morality on a transcendent being questionable. Those who believe morality is transcendentally based have to already agree on what this morality is bfore the can reason about it and use it to help make their ethical decisions. But this is the same situation the non-transcendentalist’s are in. Adding transcendence to the mix does not in itself help when there are different points of view.
In the final analysis you are going to have to do the same thing as an atheist like me: seek the passage of laws and attempt to restrain or limit morally incorrect behavior. And if necessary, use force to accomplish this.
“The better question is, for example, why ought a society choose a policy of treating prisoners of war with dignity rather than a policy of sacrificing them to the gods? Is the answer to this merely culturally conditioned — meaning there is no rational basis for choosing one policy over the other — or is there some basis upon which reasonable people can make a “right” or “moral” choice between these policy alternatives? Natural Law theory proposes that human reason and intuition can serve as meaningful guides between these alternatives because human reason and intution ultimately derive from and have access to a measuring standard (in the Christian view of Natural Law, God) that is outside of our culturally conditioned selves.”
But the Mayan Natural Law and the Christian Natural Law are not the same. I could imagine the Mayan saying I am treating the prisoner with dignity by sacrificing him to the gods.
“I’m afraid your concept of the atonement is light years away from a Christian understanding of it.”
And I would imagine that a Mayan who was being critiqued for sacrificing young maidens would say something very similar. If we had a correct understanding of his theology, we would appreciate why this sacrifice was a good derived from the ultimately good God.
“In the Christian faith Jesus is God incarnate, so it is not a question of requiring human sacrifice — it is a self-sacrifice. I suppose if you start from the presupposition of tossing out all Christian teaching and belief about Jesus, you can make statements like these. They’re hardly objective or fair, however.”
I do know there are different theological issues involving the meaning of the atonement. But it is traditional Christian doctrine that Jesus was fully human and that the spilling of His blood was required for the forgiveness of sins. Isn’t the sacrificial system set up by God in the Old Testament supposed to prefigure this? So I would not think any Christian who adhered to something like the substitionary atonement theory of Jesus’ death is being unfairly critiqed by me here.
I find the notion of sacrifice (of animal, man, god or god/man) to be a rather strange way to deal with the issue of human wrongdoing.
Also, I am unable to consider a god who requires the spilling of blood through a painful death like crucifixion to attain atonement to be the ulitmately good being that you were talking about above. Such a being is not how I would define an infinitely good God. And I think that illustrates a flaw in your view that Natural Law theory can rely on this God because He is defined to be infinitely good. People’s views of what is ‘infinitely good’ are going to vary.
“To be blunt: stuff and nonsense.
The NT documents, though written from different perspectives, have a significant degree of integrity concerning the historicity of Jesus. Recent critical efforts like the Jesus Seminar have been largely arbitrary, ideologically driven, and unscientific. But again, we could write books about those kinds of debates.”
The Jesus Sseminar is irrelevant to the issue I’ve mentioned here: the woman caught in adultery. I don’t subscribe to their schlolarly methodology – what little I know of it.
Perhaps the easiest way for you to verify that I am not relying on their scholarship is to go to http://www.bible.org and look this up in their online NET Bible. They have an excellent note to John 7:53 which explains why the woman caught in adultery should not be considered part of the original text.
By the way, here is how the Bible.org folks describe themselves on their website:
“Welcome to Bible.org, a non-profit (501c3) Christian ministry headquartered in Dallas, Texas. The Ministry launched in 1995 to leverage the Internet as a powerful new force in Christian ministry. In the last decade bible.org has grown to serve millions of individuals around the world through providing thousands of trustworthy resources for Bible study – including an exciting new translation of the Bible (the NET Bible). 2 Tim 2:2 “
David,
Just trying to catch up on some of your earlier comments.
“I didn’t mean only Natural Law can ask these questions. I’m suggesting that Natural Law is the only reasonable and coherent way to begin answering them.”
And within the context of a believing Christian community I can see how that would be true. But one would first have to adopt that Christian metaphysical system to find it as coherent and reasonable as it must appear to you.
” So far, if I understand you right, you ground the answers in evolution — “we tend to behave certain ways because of our genes.”
Not exactly. Evolution helps us to understand how we developed into the type of creatures we are, When I delight in smelling a rose, enjoy a steak dinner, yearn after a beautiful woman or am stimulated by an exchange of ideas in a conversation like we are having, in one sense this is due to the fact of my genetic heritage. But the genes don’t work in a vacuum. They can only do what they do within specific environments. The whole nature vs. nurture is a phony issue. And a very important part of the human environment is its culture.
” I see that as a factual description, not an ethical imperative. From where do you get the ethical imperative?”
Where do I get the aesthetic imperative or the lust imperative or the humor imperative? I don’t need to imagine some transcendental realm or being in order to explain or justify those imperatives.
And how is saying that all good flows from the infinitely good character of God not a factual statement? It looks to me like that is treating morality as an ‘is’ and not an ‘ought’.
“A short stab at an answer is that, with respect to human beings, God desires the ultimate good of the human beings He has created in His image; the path towards such an ultimate good requires that we be able to freely choose it; the ability to freely choose it entails the ability to reject it; and suffering in this life can ultimately produce more lasting good. With respect to the rest of creation, the issues are different because animals (and plants and microbes and such) do not possess the self-awareness of human beings, and so to speak of “suffering” outside of the human context is an anthropomorphism.”
I certainly agree that talking about suffering when it comes to plants is likely misplaced. But animals do have a nervous system like humans, so I wouldn’t think it anthropomorphic to recognized that they have feelings and suffer pain like humans.
And we now know that some primates do have a sense of self-awareness, though not nearly as developed as humans. They also can manipulate symbols and tools.
I recently read an article in Foreign Affairs on primate behavior that you might find interesting. Here’s the online link to it:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060101faessay85110/robert-m-sapolsky/a-natural-history-of-peace.html
Perhaps the easiest way for you to verify that I am not relying on their scholarship is to go to http://www.bible.org and look this up in their online NET Bible. They have an excellent note to John 7:53 which explains why the woman caught in adultery should not be considered part of the original text.
Only time for one quick comment today. Yes, there is some dispute about this particular passage. The majority view, as I understand it, is that it’s authentic. It appears in most early manuscripts and in patristic literature, and is internally consistent with the narrative and theology of the rest of the text. Since it doesn’t appear in some of the earliest manuscripts, some translaters find it of dubious authenticity. There are a few other statements of Jesus with similar questions about provenance in the NT. Usually these appear with a textual note in translations like the NIV. Outside the radical confines of the Jesus Seminar, however, there is substantial agreement on the authenticity of the vast majority of the sayings of Jesus in the Gospels — as the NET Bible you cited attests.
Those who believe morality is transcendentally based have to already agree on what this morality is bfore the can reason about it and use it to help make their ethical decisions.
While the Christian and the Mayan arguing with each other likely won’t come to a satisfactory conclusion, a resonable third party, I believe, could begin to do so. I don’t think a developed moral system has to exist before that third party begins making such conclusions. I believe it is part of reason, intuition, and human nature to be able to do so.
“Only time for one quick comment today. Yes, there is some dispute about this particular passage. The majority view, as I understand it, is that it’s authentic. It appears in most early manuscripts and in patristic literature, and is internally consistent with the narrative and theology of the rest of the text. Since it doesn’t appear in some of the earliest manuscripts, some translators find it of dubious authenticity.”
Dave, I can only suggest you go back and read the whole note to John 7:53. Here is the beginning of it:
“ This entire section, 7:53-8:11, traditionally known as the pericope adulterae, is not contained in the earliest and best mss and was almost certainly not an original part of the Gospel of John. Among modern commentators and textual critics, it is a foregone conclusion that the section is not original but represents a later addition to the text of the Gospel. B. M. Metzger summarizes: “the evidence for the non-Johannine origin of the pericope of the adulteress is overwhelming” (TCGNT 187)”
”There are a few other statements of Jesus with similar questions about provenance in the NT. Usually these appear with a textual note in translations like the NIV. Outside the radical confines of the Jesus Seminar, however, there is substantial agreement on the authenticity of the vast majority of the sayings of Jesus in the Gospels — as the NET Bible you cited attests.
That is the theological view that I would expect a conservative, evangelical organization like bible.org to adhere to. And it also is why I thought it would provide good evidence that despite that particular theological bias, they still don’t think this particular scene is part of the original gospel.
I wasn’t relying on the Jesus Seminar for that claim. I haven’t relied on them for any of the statements I’ve made regarding the New Testament, so I’m not sure why you think it appropriate to keep mentioning them. If they happen to agree with anything I’ve said here, it is purely accidental as far as I am concerned.
David,
To be honest, I’m still rather stunned by your characterization of this rather lengthy note written by the Bible.org folks. The whole note is really to long to quote entirely, but I though I should provide some more quotes to indicate why are I think you’ve totally mischaracterized what was written in it.
Here are the quotes from the NET bible note to John 7:59:
“In evaluating this ms evidence, it should be remembered that in the Gospels A is considered to be of Byzantine texttype (unlike in the epistles and Revelation, where it is Alexandrian), as are E F G (mss with the same designation are of Western texttype in the epistles). This leaves D as the only major Western uncial witness in the Gospels for the inclusion. Therefore the evidence could be summarized by saying that almost all early mss of the Alexandrian texttype omit the pericope, while most mss of the Western and Byzantine texttype include it. But it must be remembered that “Western mss” here refers only to D, a single witness (as far as Greek mss are concerned). Thus it can be seen that practically all of the earliest and best mss extant omit the pericope; it is found only in mss of secondary importance.
Conclusion: In the final analysis, the weight of evidence in this case must go with the external evidence. The earliest and best mss do not contain the pericope. It is true with regard to internal evidence that an attractive case can be made for inclusion, but this is by nature subjective (as evidenced by the fact that strong arguments can be given against such as well). In terms of internal factors like vocabulary and style, the pericope does not stand up very well.”
Ahab:
As to John 7:59, I really don’t want to get into a lenghty debate about it. It’s a side issue at best, and whether it’s an authentic statement or not is irrelvant to the authenticity of the gospels as a whole and to the ethics and theology of Jesus. Certainly Jesus’ ethic of forgiveness doesn’t in any sense turn on that one passage, as the Sermon on the Mount and many other of his acts and teachings amply demonstrate.
I don’t know enough about the NET Bible to know why they insist on taking a side as to the provenance of this one passage. Often there is some kind of theological or political motivation behind that kind of stance where reasonable conservative scholars disagree on how certain words should be interpreted or whether a passage should be included in the canon. I don’t have time to research this one right now. Perhaps that is just their conclusion based on the scholarship, which is fine.
As I see it, there are good arguments on either side from conservative scholars about whether to include this passage in the canon, and its exclusion, if that is the ultimate verdict, doesn’t affect the ethics or theology of Jesus a whit. So, interesting academic discussion, but I don’t see that it impacts at all on the broader discussion about Natural Law and ethics.
But it is traditional Christian doctrine that Jesus was fully human and that the spilling of His blood was required for the forgiveness of sins. Isn’t the sacrificial system set up by God in the Old Testament supposed to prefigure this? So I would not think any Christian who adhered to something like the substitionary atonement theory of Jesus’ death is being unfairly critiqed by me here.
I don’t think you really understand substitutionary atonement. In a system of human sacrifice like the Mayan’s the gods must be repeatedly appeased with the blood of unwilling human victims. The Mayan gods remain angry and do not identify in any way with their worshippers or with the sacrificial victims. That has nothing to do with the Christian doctrine of the atonement, unless it is some sort of demonic parody.
In the Christian doctrine of substitutionary atonement, God is justified in leaving us to the consequences of our own sin. Nevertheless, even though we have rejected Him, He himself becomes one of us. In Christ, he empties himself of his privileges and shares in our suffereings (the “kenosis”). He allows us, the creatures whom he would be justified in wiping from the face of the earth, to humiliate him and kill him. He willingly takes our place and bears the rightful judicial punishment for our sin. The key to that punishment is not only his physical suffering, but even more so the separation of the Son from the presence and fellowship of the Father. “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me” are the most profound words Jesus ever spoke. (Matt. 27:46)
Moreover, you need to tie this understanding of the subustitionary nature of the atonement with other theories of the atonment to gain a full picture of it. There is an important aspect of the atonement in which Christ’s death is a paradoxical victory over sin and death (the “Christus Victor” theory). There is another important aspect of the atonement in which it represents an example for us of sacrificial love (the “moral influence” theory).
There is an excellent book called “Violence, Hospitality and the Cross” by Reformed theologian Hans Booresma that ties all these theologies of the atonemment together and shows how the violence of the atonement is a necessary component of the hospitality God offers to us.
I know Bertrand Russell, Richard Dawkins, and folks like that have critiqued Christianity with these characitatures of what Christians believe. Whether what Christians believe is ultimately true or not, those kinds of charicatures are so narrow and badly uninformed about historical Christian theology that I have to consider them slanderous.
I find the notion of sacrifice (of animal, man, god or god/man) to be a rather strange way to deal with the issue of human wrongdoing.
Why? What is the basis for your ethical judgment here? It certainly can’t be rooted in evolutionary history, which is a history of violent sacrifice in service of the survival of genes. Given the pervasiveness of the theme of sacrifice in human culture and religion, if there’s any truth to evolutionary psychology, it seems that we’re hard-wired to associate violence with guilt.
I don’t think you really understand substitutionary atonement.
David,
I understand all too well the doctrine of substitutionary atonement. It requires the torture and death of a human in order that sins may be forgiven. It’s irrelevant whether or not this human volunteered for the job. Any god who actually demands such a thing is not the infinitely good Being (if there even is One) as far as I am concerned because he doesn’t meet my definition of such a Being. The slaughter of a human for other’s sins is immoral, how could an infinitely good Being desire such a thing?
So I don’t see the issue as one of understanding or misunderstanding. It’s a difference between us of what we think is right and wrong. It appears that you think torture and death in order to effect forgiveness of sins is a good thing as long as it is derived from God’s nature. I differ with you, I think it a bad thing.
Your use of the Mayan sacrificial system here is, I think, just a red herring. We would both agree that it was an evil system, but that is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not the doctrine of substitutionary atonement is a good thing. Each has to be judged on its own merits. Personally, I find them both bad.
As to whether my charge is a caricature: was Jesus fully human? Was his death by crucifixion necessary for the atonement of sins? If you answer yes to both those questions, then I think my criticism of substitutionary atonement fair. The demand by a god that blood be shed to pay for other’s sins is an immoral demand in my view.
Also, not all Christians buy into the doctrine of substitutionary atonement. So my criticism here isn’t really being directed to Christianity per se, but only that branch of it that has embraced this doctrine.
Why? What is the basis for your ethical judgment here? It certainly can’t be rooted in evolutionary history, which is a history of violent sacrifice in service of the survival of genes.
I’m sorry but that is simply a gross misunderstanding of how research into the evolutionary development of humans is helping us to understand how and why we make moral decisions. Over ninety percent of the time humans have lived on this planet has been spent in small hunter-gatherer types of social systems. Those systems require the cooperation and empathy of its members for survival.
Given the pervasiveness of the theme of sacrifice in human culture and religion, if there’s any truth to evolutionary psychology, it seems that we’re hard-wired to associate violence with guilt.
Sacrifice can be a very good thing. Or it can be very bad. Depends on the situation and the type of sacrifice.
So, interesting academic discussion, but I don’t see that it impacts at all on the broader discussion about Natural Law and ethics.
True, it is a side issue here. However, your response to the evidence presented for the exclusion of the woman taken in adultery from the original gospel of John was so extremely different from how I would have responded that I have reluctantly come to the decision that it is probably best that I bow out of this conversation at this point.
Considering how radically different our views seem to be, I do fully appreciate your having allowed me to express mine so freely on your blog site. I see that as an act of true generosity. Thanks.
Considering how radically different our views seem to be, I do fully appreciate your having allowed me to express mine so freely on your blog site. I see that as an act of true generosity. Thanks.
Ahab — Ok, thanks for stopping by. I hope you do have a chance to read the “Violence, Hospitality and the Cross” book, though. I hope you’d then see why our perspectives on the substitutionary atonement are so radically different.
2005 world cup is coming in germany.
Cats will never be dogs and vice versa.