There is an interesting article in this month’s Economist that illustrates, I think, some of the problems with social Darwinism, particularly when it is linked to a particular political outlook, as seemingly inevitably is the case. The article reports on a study of six people who have suffered damage to a part of the brain (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC)) that is involved with social emotion. The study showed that these people were more likely than a control group to provide a “utilitarian” answer to the “runaway train paradox.”
The “runaway train paradox” involves two dilemmas — in one, you must decide whether to push a person in front of an oncoming train in order to slow the train before it hits five other people further down the line; in the other, you must decide whether to switch the track so that that train will hit only one person further down the line rather than hitting five people. Most people will hesistate to push a person in front of the train to save five lives, but will not hesistate to switch the track so that the train hits one person further down the line instead of five. The six subjects with damaged VMPC’s felt the same about both possibilities — they would not hesitate in either case to sacrifice one person in order to save five.
The article explains that “In these cases it seems that the decision on how to act is not a single, rational calculation of the sort that moral philosophers have generally assumed is going on, but a conflict between two processes, with one (the emotional) sometimes able to override the other (the utilitarian, the location of which this study does not address).” This yin-and-yang of emotional and rational responses, the article says, “fits with one of the tenets of evolutionary psychology…. This is that minds are composed of modules evolved for given purposes…. The VMPC may be the site of a ‘moral-decision’ module, linked to the social emotions, that either regulates or is regulated by an as-yet-unlocated utilitarian module. “
So far, perhaps, so good. All of this seems very speculative, and a sample size of six people with brain damage hardly seems adequate, but nevertheless, it wouldn’t be surprising that the emotional and rational aspects of moral reasoning relate to different parts of the brain, and it doesn’t problematic per se if those parts of the brain developed over time through evolutionary processes. The kicker is in the article’s concluding paragraph: “This does not answer the question of what this module (what philosophers woudl call ‘moral sense’) is actually for. But it does suggest the question should be addressed functionally, rather than in the abstract. Time, perhaps, for philosophers to put away their copies of Kant and pull a dusty tome of Darwin off the bookshelf.”
It seems to me that in this paragraph the article crosses from descriptive to prescriptive; from science to metaphysics. This is particularly so in that, as a devoted reader of the Economist, I’m well aware of that magazine’s pragmatist / libertarian political philosophy and its slant towards materialist metaphysics. In a very subtle way, this is an example of the materialist / pragmatist saying: “See there … all that ‘moral sense’ and whot is in your head. We shall move beyond this and learn to develop our utilitarian modules.”
One reply on “The Neurology of Morality and the Politics of Science”
David,
I agree with your assessment. To make the leap from “this is what this material thing does” and “this is how this material thing developed to perform this function” to “therefore biology and chemistry are all she wrote” is perposterous. Almost as if it’s a given that there is a transcendent morality for this organ to “sense” in the first place. Moreover, who decided that sacraficing one life to save five is even “good” morality? Is that a transcendent idea that this organ senses or did we elect somebody to decide that for us? And if we can decide these things by logical deduction, then why do we need this organ to “sense” morality?
Here is a little scenario to demonstrate just how incompatable social Darwinism is with a morally intelligable universe. Imagine the most die-hard materialist you can think of. Now imagine that he has a son. Unfortunately, this kid likes to play in the street. If left unsupervised for any amount of time, he heads straight for traffic. But there is a material explanation. In fact, DNA studies have just confirmed that he carries a rare gene that codes for this sort of self-destructive behavior. Despite being dealt this hand, our atheist friend has high hopes that by treating this condition, his son can live somewhat of a normal life.
Now fast forward a few years. The unthinkable has happened. The boy slipped out of sight one afternoon and wandered into traffic. There are many people at the funeral making their way through the line to offer condolences to the family. Somewhere in this line, there is a Christian immediately followed by an Atheist. The Christian approaches the greiving father and says, “We are so sorry for your loss, our prayers are with you and your family during this difficult time, we know that somehow in the providence of God, these things all work together for our good and His glory” and moves on.
As you can expect, this is not what our greiving atheist father wants to hear. His first inclination is to angrily respond with the following, “Don’t you get it? There is nothing else! Nada! You die – and that’s it. There is no meaning, no purpose, no ryme or reason – just life and death. Stop fooling yourself with these dilusional notions of higher meaning and purpose! Wake up!” However, despite his strong atheist convictions, he immediately recognizes that such a statment would be entirely inapproapriate. So he simply smiles and says, “thank you for your thoughts and pryers.” Now is not the time to make a scene just to prove a philosophical point.
Now what just happened here? Who decided what was “appropriate” behavior given the situation and on what basis? What kind of “moral sense” caused our friend to bite his tounge? Certainly, if his Christian “comforter” is living in a state of self-deception, our atheist friend should come to his rescue. Certainly that would be serve the greatest good in this situation. Why not take this opportunity to liberate a fellow human being from these dilusions of a higher power. But why doesn’t he?
Next up, a fellow atheist. This should be interesting. Knowing that his buddy can’t stand schmaltzy sentiments for the afterlife, he cuts right to the chase, “Well man, you have to look at the big picture. Our species as a whole is definitley better off without your mutant kid’s traffic loving genes floating around in the genepool. You got to let evolution run its course. It has worked for 3.8 billion years, just let it ride. And this is no occasion for sadness! Take comfort in nature, who wisely selected your kid’s retarded genes for elimination! Besides, you guys can probably make another one who is for fit for survival.”
What father wouldn’t think twice about knocking your block off for making such a rediculous statement? And yet, in strict terms of biology, there is absolutely nothing incorrect about such an assertion. This does appear to be how our envioronment “decides” what heritable traits make it to the next round. In terms of a materialist worldview, it certainly has more scientific merit than the other example. But in a moment like this, not even the most die-hard materialist will consistently live out his “faith” in nature. And yet, this is exactly the kind of tragedy where even a half-hearted Christian clings to his faith and attempts to fit the facts of the case into a theistic framework of interpretation.
Sorry for the long post.
GJG