Douglas Groothuis’ review essay on natural theology (Books & Culture, July/August 2008) is disappointing, particularly in its treatment of Alister McGrath’s work. Groothuis considers McGrath’s “In the Twilight of Atheism” to be “unphilosophical.” Twlight, however, is more of a historical than a philosophical argument, as Groothuis observes. For philosophical arguments, Groothuis should have turned to McGrath’s “Intellectuals Don’t Need God (and Other Myths)” as well as McGrath’s more pastoral work on these themes, “Doubting.” Concerning very specific historical, philosophical, and theological arguments against the “new atheists,” Groothuis could have read McGrath’s “Dawkins’ God: Genes, Memes, and the Meaning of Life” and “The Dawkins Delusion.”
Groothuis does refer in an off-handed footnote to McGrath’s “The Science of God,” but he apparently completely misunderstands McGrath’s Scientific Theology project, which is fleshed out more fully in three massive volumes that Groothuis fails to mention. Far from “remov[ing] the possibility that [natural theology] provides evidence for the existence of God apart from the Bible,” McGrath states explicity, in the very pages cited by Groothuis, that “[o]n the basis of a detailed survey of the biblical material, it seems that a knowledge of God [from nature], however limited, is indeed presupposed.” (Science of God, p. 79.) McGrath then carefully demonstrates, followingThomas Torrance, why Karl Barth’s wholesale rejection of natural theology was an overreaction to some of the intellectual currents of Barth’s day. (Science of God, pp. 82-91).
McGrath concludes the section on natural theology in The Science of God by affirming that “the human mind possesses the capacity to recognize [God’s] work of creation as such, and to draw at least some reliable conclusions concerning the nature and character of God from the created order.” (Science of God, p. 89.) Groothuis’ real beef with McGrath’s Scientific Theology seems to be McGrath’s careful conclusion that this affirmation is not a “‘necessary truth of reason,'” but rather rests on some presuppositions that can be known only through revelation. This is hardly a “redefinition” of natural theology, pace Groothuis, but rather is fully consistent with the Reformed tradition concerning human noetic limitations.
While it is inexcusable that Groothuis gives such short shrift to McGrath’s earlier work, it is inconceivable that Groothuis missed McGrath’s magesterial new book, “The Open Secret: A New Perspective on Natural Theology.” McGrath there lays out a detailed, balanced, nuanced, and thoroughly Reformed and Biblial natural theology, summarized as follows: “A Christian natural theology is about seeing nature in a specific manner, which allows the observer to discern in what is seen the truth, beauty, and goodness of a trinitarain God who is already known; and which allows nature to function as a pathway towards this same God for secular culture as a whole.” (The Open Secret, p. 148.)
One wonders whether Groothuis’ real problem with McGrath is that, unlike many American rationalistic apologists — including Groothuis — McGrath consistently refuses to buy into the false notion that analytic philosophy can provide logical proof of God or that “strong” intelligent design theory adds anything meaningful to reasoned apologetics. In fact, in his anti-Dawkins books, McGrath properly takes the strong intelligent design program to task as a warmed-over version of William Paley’s long-discredited “watchmaker” argument. It seems that, in some circles, any theologian who questions the strong intelligent design lobby gets “expelled” from the discussion. Yet, McGrath is warm to the Reformed and Patristic understanding that nature displays “intelligent design” in its beauty and regularity, and that the “fine tuning” of the universe for human life “corresponds to a Christian understanding of the nature of God.” (The Open Secret, p. 244). It is a shame that Groothuis’ own limited horizons blind him to McGrath’s signficant contribution to developing a natural theology for our times.
4 replies on “Groothuis on McGrath”
This is Doug Groothuis. I did read all those books by AM you mentioned, and I still think McGrath is a very poor philosopher. When he debated Dawkins, he lost because he does not use ID arguments and becaue he is committed to methodological naturalism. When Lennox debated Dawkins, Lennox won, because Lennox (with three doctorates) uses ID arguments and challenges methological naturalism.
ID is not “warmed over Paley”! This old canard is worn out and is ridiculous. The ID argumetns are much more sophisticated and use new information, especially about the cell and the fine tuning of the universe for life. But Paley was no slouch either. He is often rejected in a cavilier and unfair way.
Hi Doug, I’m glad you stopped by. I don’t know how you measure who “won” or “lost” a public debate, which IMHO often has more to do with style than substance (and which is one reason I think staged public apologetic debates are usually pointless at best). But in my estimation, McGrath’s “Dawkins’ God” and “The Dawkins Delusion” are pretty devastating critiques of Dawkins. It’s baffling to me why you would dismiss them so off-handedly.
As to what I’ve called strong ID arguments, we’ll probably have to agree to disagree, at least to a certain extent. I don’t find the arguments about cellular motors and such very convincing. They are fundamentally God of the gaps arguments, IMHO, and at least to some extent it appears that some of those gaps are being closed. Yes, I’m well aware of the arguments about whether Ken Miller and the like have really shown that cooption of parts for the flagellar motor is possible — quite honestly I find many of Miller’s claims tendentious at best. But if a “proof” of God’s design in creation hinges on arcane debates over whether or not the scientific literature establishes cooption of flagellar motor parts, it seems to me we should be looking for more meaningful and enduring proofs.
I personally find cosmological design arguments more convincing, but particularly in the way McGrath does — as consistent with, but not as proof of, a Christian perspective on design and creation. Again, the cosmological arguments are fundamentally gap arguments, which theoretically could be closed some day. The difference is that it appears very implausible that the singularity before the big bang can be explained with anything other than pie-in-the-sky multiverse theories. But then, science has in the past explained things that have seemed equally like black boxes. It would not surprise me if we someday discover that the universe(s) God created is(are) even stranger than we can now imagine.
I truly don’t understand the way in which you dismiss McGrath’s overall perspective on natural theology, which he develops in his Scientific Theology and in The Open Secret. It seems to me a solidly Biblical and Reformed perspective which recognizes human noetic limits. Of course, all of this was probably developed in a tighter way both philosophically and theologically by McGrath’s muse, Thomas Torrance. Any suggestion that Torrance’s natural theology is a “redefinition” of the tradition, as you did with respect to McGrath, would seem to me absurd. In fact, I’d go further and argue that trying to identify a “designer,” which might or might not be God, based on apparent gaps in natural history, is the real redefinition of Biblical natural theology going on here. If you want to call it “natural theology,” at least drop the ID pretense that the “designer” doesn’t have to be the triune God.
On McGrath and “methodological naturalism,” I have to ask what you make of his Scientific Theology in this regard. I think his use of critical realism here is brilliant. Have you read any of Roy Bhaskar’s work on critical realism? Critical realism should be a way forward between the polar opposites of “methodological naturalism” and whatever it is the ID program offers (honestly, I’m not really clear what governing methodology strong ID offers, other than using some filters to infer “design” while apparently leaving everything else to chance). Critical realism, in my estimation, functions much like Thomas Aquinas’ ontology and understanding of causation in nature. There is no reason why the fact that nature usually operates according to natural laws should preclude other layers of reality in which “mind” and the divine are quite real causitive agents, exerting downward causation on the material layers. This is consistent with the classical theistic notion of primary and secondary causation. Strong ID may be consistent with this, it isn’t required to defeat materialism / naturalism. Why make it seem that the validity of theism as against materialism hangs by such a slender thread?
But above all this, what I really am having trouble with these days is how American evangelicals (of which I have counted myself one for over 30 years) have grabbed onto ID as some sort of proof against biological evolution (meaning simply common descent). I would suggest that many popular apologists are either ignorant of what ID actually argues or are disingenuous on this point. At best, strong ID might tell us that some unidentified designer directed certain discrete processes in a non-stochastic way. Even given this, the powerful genetic and fossil evidence for common descent remains intact. Strong ID doesn’t change in the slightest the fact that dissimilar organisms share similar genetic markers, including large chunks of non-coding DNA, viral insertions, shared point mutations, and so on. It amazes me that most evangelicals I talk to don’t even realize that Mike Behe (whom I respect, BTW) fully accepts the validity of common descent.
I’d daresay that most American evangelicals, when they think about ID, are really interested in finding support for a reading of Genesis 1-3 that precludes continuity and gradual change in the development of life on Earth. In my experience, broad philosophical arguments about causation and materialism go right over the heads of most people. What we need more than anything, in my opinion, is a more robust hermeneutic that allows us to examine the genetic and fossil evidence uncovered by the natural sciences without defensive posturing or fear. If we could do this, I suspect our need for “proofs” of design based on apparent gaps in the development of life would diminish, and we’d be able to focus instead, as McGrath does, on the broad and consistent way in which the entire creation declares the glory of God.
This is an excellent assessment of Groothius’ review. I had in mind to write a response raising these exact points. Thanks for doing it for me, and so eloquently at that! I found the review of Begbie’s new book quite “Off-key” as well, sadly.
I must also stand firmly against Groothius’ equally adamant suggestion that McGrath is a “poor philosopher.” Especially for a person without a doctoral specialization in philosophy, McGrath is quite on target, especially with his articulation and application of critical realist epistemology in The Open Secret. Have you yet written a review of The Open Secret? I am working on one now. I’d love to dialog with you about it. If you get a chance, please send me an e-mail (to the e-mail address I gave to post this).
I would like to hear more from Groothius about his reasoning behind rejecting McGrath’s approach. I don’t want to make the mistake of rejecting his opinions tout court, without hearing him out fully.
Thanks for your blog! I just found it now!
David,
Interesting post and comments – unfortunately Groothuis’s article is only in the print edition of Books and Culture, so I couldn’t go look at it. Ah well – the greater discussion show no signs of abating soon.