4 replies on “My Second Post on ID and Law at Science and the Sacred”
This is somewhat peripheral to the topic at hand there, so i’ll ask it at your blog. One of the implications of Daubert is that, in their role as gatekeepers, courts have to make judgements about who qualifies as an expert witness.
Take a hypothetical case about HIV/AIDS, and throw in Peter Duesberg. He’s clearly an expert in virology, but he just as clearly applies unscientific reasoning and standards when he attacks the evidence for a connection between HIV and AIDS. Won’t the courts have to engage in some sort of demarcation evaluation when determining what, precisely, Duesberg is able to give testimony about? If so, then didn’t Jones have to perform an equivalent demarcation analysis in order to determine how much credence to give witnesses like Behe?
Hi Jay. Yes that’s a fair point, but it’s a little more complicated than that. What I’m trying to suggest is that Kitzmiller wasn’t the forum for a Daubert-type analysis. Behe was certainly qualified to testify about a variety of things relating to ID, what ID advocates believe, etc. Was he qualified to testify on the philosophical definition of “science?” I don’t know, but my point is that this shouldn’t have been the focus of the case. Courts are good at coming up with pragmatic definitions of things like “science” when the issue is “what evidence should be given to the jury in a product liability case.” Courts are not good at defining things like “science” for society generally — really, I’m not sure any social institution is qualified to take on that broad a task.
For starters, hope you and your family had a great Thanksgiving.
A few thoughts, from specific to general.
Wouldn’t Jones not having ruled on the science simply been seen as an invitation for some other school district to cover its tracks more carefully, and craft a pro-ID policy while studiously avoiding revealing any religious intent? In other words, wouldn’t we be back in a different court a year later, with that court left with no choice but to take this issue head on? I think this is the reason that both sides attempted to get witnesses to speak to the scientific nature of ID, and asked to judge to rule on that: if this case didn’t deal with it, the next will, and there will always be a next case.
(This is, of course, where my lack of knowledge of the legal system kicks in – i don’t know how seriously judges need to take requests of litigants, the risk of leaving legal loose ends, etc.)
I’d agree with you that the way the legal system’s handled defining science is a bit problematic, both here and in Epperson, etc. because of the changing nature of science. A few centuries back, when something resembling science was just getting started, stuffing God in the gaps was expected behavior among the protoscientists – eventually, the scientific and theological issues of the practice were recognized, and science evolved accordingly. So, far, the courts have gone for a static analysis – this is what science is now.
Jones did all the right things in defining science as it now exists, but he should have focused on the process (what do the NAS and AAAS say, etc.), rather than the results. A periodic repeat of the process would allow the legal system to stay up to date should science continue to evolve.
And, finally, the most general: demarcation issues have vexed people in history, philosophy, sociology, and science. Why should the law get off so easily?
Jay, you make some good points. One of the main points of my piece was to suggest that there are different “demarcation” roles for different institutions within our political system. Courts have a narrow demarcation role with respect to expert testimony. But courts do not have a broad demarcation role in society generally. Courts just aren’t equipped to serve that function. Remember, it is not unconstitutional to teach something in a public school simply because it isn’t “science” — philosophy, English literature, history, even comparative religions, all are ok subjects. Courts shouldn’t be in the business of deciding what goes in the “science” curriculum. That is the province of local school boards, under the guidance of State and Federal standards-setting bodies. Yes, this would indeed likely result in additional rounds of local disputes about whether some version of ID should be taught in public school classrooms, but the democratic process connected to the institutions that handle these questions is robust enough to deal with that eventuality.
4 replies on “My Second Post on ID and Law at Science and the Sacred”
This is somewhat peripheral to the topic at hand there, so i’ll ask it at your blog. One of the implications of Daubert is that, in their role as gatekeepers, courts have to make judgements about who qualifies as an expert witness.
Take a hypothetical case about HIV/AIDS, and throw in Peter Duesberg. He’s clearly an expert in virology, but he just as clearly applies unscientific reasoning and standards when he attacks the evidence for a connection between HIV and AIDS. Won’t the courts have to engage in some sort of demarcation evaluation when determining what, precisely, Duesberg is able to give testimony about? If so, then didn’t Jones have to perform an equivalent demarcation analysis in order to determine how much credence to give witnesses like Behe?
Hi Jay. Yes that’s a fair point, but it’s a little more complicated than that. What I’m trying to suggest is that Kitzmiller wasn’t the forum for a Daubert-type analysis. Behe was certainly qualified to testify about a variety of things relating to ID, what ID advocates believe, etc. Was he qualified to testify on the philosophical definition of “science?” I don’t know, but my point is that this shouldn’t have been the focus of the case. Courts are good at coming up with pragmatic definitions of things like “science” when the issue is “what evidence should be given to the jury in a product liability case.” Courts are not good at defining things like “science” for society generally — really, I’m not sure any social institution is qualified to take on that broad a task.
For starters, hope you and your family had a great Thanksgiving.
A few thoughts, from specific to general.
Wouldn’t Jones not having ruled on the science simply been seen as an invitation for some other school district to cover its tracks more carefully, and craft a pro-ID policy while studiously avoiding revealing any religious intent? In other words, wouldn’t we be back in a different court a year later, with that court left with no choice but to take this issue head on? I think this is the reason that both sides attempted to get witnesses to speak to the scientific nature of ID, and asked to judge to rule on that: if this case didn’t deal with it, the next will, and there will always be a next case.
(This is, of course, where my lack of knowledge of the legal system kicks in – i don’t know how seriously judges need to take requests of litigants, the risk of leaving legal loose ends, etc.)
I’d agree with you that the way the legal system’s handled defining science is a bit problematic, both here and in Epperson, etc. because of the changing nature of science. A few centuries back, when something resembling science was just getting started, stuffing God in the gaps was expected behavior among the protoscientists – eventually, the scientific and theological issues of the practice were recognized, and science evolved accordingly. So, far, the courts have gone for a static analysis – this is what science is now.
Jones did all the right things in defining science as it now exists, but he should have focused on the process (what do the NAS and AAAS say, etc.), rather than the results. A periodic repeat of the process would allow the legal system to stay up to date should science continue to evolve.
And, finally, the most general: demarcation issues have vexed people in history, philosophy, sociology, and science. Why should the law get off so easily?
Jay, you make some good points. One of the main points of my piece was to suggest that there are different “demarcation” roles for different institutions within our political system. Courts have a narrow demarcation role with respect to expert testimony. But courts do not have a broad demarcation role in society generally. Courts just aren’t equipped to serve that function. Remember, it is not unconstitutional to teach something in a public school simply because it isn’t “science” — philosophy, English literature, history, even comparative religions, all are ok subjects. Courts shouldn’t be in the business of deciding what goes in the “science” curriculum. That is the province of local school boards, under the guidance of State and Federal standards-setting bodies. Yes, this would indeed likely result in additional rounds of local disputes about whether some version of ID should be taught in public school classrooms, but the democratic process connected to the institutions that handle these questions is robust enough to deal with that eventuality.