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A draft of a paper I’m working on:<\/p>\nA draft of a paper I’m working on:<\/p>\n
Table of Contents<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n Introduction.\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n Molinism and the Contemporary Molinist Theodicy of Eschatology.<\/a> This paper examines Molinism as a form of eschatological theodicy in light of modal arguments concerning \u201claws of nature,\u201d modern multiverse cosmologies, and the Christian doctrine of creation.\u00a0 First, the paper will introduce the concept of Molinism and explain how it relates to modern eschatological theodicies.\u00a0 Next, the paper will discuss one of the major philosophical objections to Molinism, which is based on the ontology of alternative pasts.\u00a0 The paper will then examine a question that has not yet been explored in the existing literature:\u00a0 how this ontological objection to Molinism connects with similar discussions in cosmology and the philosophy of science about laws of nature and the possibility of a multiverse.\u00a0 The paper will conclude with a discussion of how these ontological questions present problems in connection with the Christian doctrine of creation.\u00a0 The paper\u2019s central claim is that Molinism is finally inconsistent with the classical Christian doctrine of creation.<\/p>\n Molinism is a view about divine providence and human freedom attributed to Luis de Molina (1535-1600 C.E.).[1]<\/a>\u00a0 In modern philosophical theology, it is often proposed as a mediating position between Calvinist-Jansenist determinism and open theism.[2]<\/a>\u00a0 The strong Calvinist-Jansenist determinist position asserts that God meticulously ordains all things that happen, including the salvation or reprobation of human beings. [3]<\/a> \u00a0The open theist position asserts that God allows the decisions of free creatures to decide at least some future events, such that God chooses not to know or cannot know some future events.[4]<\/a>\u00a0 Molinism asserts that God foreknows all possible future events and providentially arranges actual events such that God\u2019s good plans are realized in a way that accounts for the actual or possible choices of free creatures.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n In addition to serving as a general theory of the relation to divine providence and creaturely freedom, for some conservative evangelical apologists Molinism supplies an eschatological theodicy.[6]<\/a>\u00a0 These apologists deploy Molinism as a response to the justice of consigning people to Hell who have never heard the Gospel.[7]<\/a>\u00a0 They argue that for this set of persons God in his \u201cmiddle knowledge\u201d knows who would not accept the Gospel.\u00a0 God is then not culpable for failing to arrange for such persons to hear the Gospel, because such persons would not have responded in faith even if they had heard.\u00a0 Molinists often use the term \u201ctransworld damnation\u201d to describe people who would not respond to the Gospel in faith in any potential world known by God.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n This does not mean that Molinists think anyone who never hears the Gospel necessarily is damned.\u00a0 These apologists recognize that the Old Testament saints and children who die in infancy have never heard the Gospel, but allow for the salvation of such persons, and they also acknowledge that some people who in the light of general revelation throw themselves upon God\u2019s mercy can be saved without explicitly knowing of Christ.[9]<\/a>\u00a0 Nevertheless, they assert that God\u2019s middle knowledge of how a person would <\/em>respond defeats arguments against the justice of the damnation of people who never hear the Gospel.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n One substantial criticism that has been leveled against Molinism is based on the ontological question of past events and causality.[11]<\/a>\u00a0 Molinism asserts that there are potential past events that never occur in history because God providentially orders history in such a way that those events are never actualized.\u00a0 This raises the question of the ontological status of these \u201calternative pasts.\u201d\u00a0 Critics of Molinism argue that the concept of alternative, unrealized pasts that cause changes in future events (by influencing God\u2019s decisions about the ordering of history) makes no logical sense.\u00a0 Molinists respond that their proposal retains its logical force because it does not entail actual<\/em> alternative pasts but only potential<\/em> events known to God.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n There is almost no reference in the philosophical theology literature connecting Molinism to related debates in scientific cosmology and the philosophy of science about modal arguments concerning the laws of nature and the possibility of a multiverse.[13]<\/a>\u00a0 This is surprising because the underlying metaphysical question is precisely the same:\u00a0 what is the nature of other counterfactual universes?\u00a0 This underlying metaphysical question relates to the central theological locus of the doctrine of creation:\u00a0 what does it mean to posit, as Christian theology does, an ontological distinction between God and creation?[14]<\/a>\u00a0 By examining the doctrines of Divine providence and eschatology apart from the doctrine of creation, the Molinist eschatological theodicy introduces a systemic distortion into Christian thought about the integrity and contingency of creation.\u00a0 It is the same kind of distortion produced by multiverse arguments proposed by atheist philosophers to explain the apparent fine-tuning of our universe against cosmological arguments for the existence of God.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n Natural science is often described as a discipline that confines its investigation to the operation of the laws of nature.[16]<\/a>\u00a0 While this is a fair as a rough operative description, the question of whether \u201claws of nature\u201d exist and how human beings might identify them is subject to significant debate in the philosophy of science.[17]<\/a>\u00a0 Many philosophers approach this question by making modal arguments based on counterfactual universes that are different than our observable universe.[18]<\/a>\u00a0 This method raises questions about the metaphysical status of these plausible alternative universes and of our observable universe.[19]<\/a>\u00a0 Some philosophers question whether imagined counterfactual universes relate to contingent facts of the observable universe, particularly given the context- and time-sensitivity of causal statements and the questions of the transitivity of causation and the preemption of events in a causal chain.[20]<\/a><\/p>\n Another version of this modal problem results from cosmological theories that entail a multiverse.\u00a0 String theory, for example, is a leading alternative to the \u201cstandard model\u201d of big bang cosmology.[21]<\/a>\u00a0 String theory posits a number \u2013 perhaps an infinity \u2013 of universes.\u00a0 If string theory is true, it could be that each of the alternative universes imagined in modal arguments about laws of nature actually exist.\u00a0 Moreover, if any multiverse theory is true, the apparent \u201cfine tuning\u201d of our universe for carbon-based life would prove unremarkable, since the dice has been rolled, so to speak, until all probabilities are realized \u2013 indeed, the dice may have been rolled an infinite number of times.<\/p>\n The philosophical connection between Molinism and the cosmological questions mentioned above is striking.\u00a0 In each case, a problem of contingency is addressed by universalizing all the possibilities and thereby isolating or perhaps even eliminating the contingency.\u00a0 The specific premises of each argument differ, but the underlying assumption that possible alternative universes provide meaningful explanations is common across each argument.\u00a0 Consider the following form of each argument:[22]<\/a><\/p>\n
\n The Objection to Molinism Based on the Ontology of Alternative Pasts.\u00a0<\/a>
\n The Unexplored Relation of the Ontological Objection to Molinism and Problems in Modern Cosmology and the Philosophy of Science.\u00a0<\/a>
\nModal Arguments Concerning Laws of Nature.\u00a0<\/a>
\nMultiverse Cosmologies and the Reality of Other Universes.\u00a0<\/a>
\nThe Connection With Molinism<\/a>
\n Alternative Universes and the Doctrine of Creation<\/a><\/p>\n<\/a>Introduction<\/h4>\n
<\/a>Molinism and the Contemporary Molinist Theodicy of Eschatology<\/u><\/h4>\n
<\/a>The Objection to Molinism Based on the Ontology of Alternative Pasts<\/u><\/h4>\n
<\/a>The Unexplored Relation of the Ontological Objection to Molinism and Problems in Modern Cosmology and the Philosophy of Science<\/u><\/u><\/h4>\n
<\/a>Modal Arguments Concerning Laws of Nature<\/u><\/h4>\n
<\/a>Multiverse Cosmologies and the Reality of Other Universes<\/u><\/h4>\n
<\/a>The Connection With Molinism<\/u><\/h4>\n