This is a section of a book I’m working on about law, neuroscience, and theology, drawn from my Ph.D. dissertation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As discussed in Chapter 1, neurolaw is one manifestation of the \u201cnew moral science\u201d critiqued by James Davidson Hunter\u2019s and Paul Nedelisky\u2019s in their excellent book Science and the Good: The Tragic Quest for the Foundations of Morality<\/a><\/em>.[1]<\/a>\u00a0 One of Hunter\u2019s and Nedelisky\u2019s central claims is that the new moral science fails because it violates the \u201cis-ought\u201d rule.\u00a0 According to Hunter and Nedelisky, the facts of human evolution and neurochemistry do not entail ethical imperatives because they are merely facts about what is.\u00a0\u00a0 The are several reasons why this is the wrong line of critique, even though the critique is important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First, Hunter and Nedelisky do not really grapple with how\nneuroscientific reductionists handle the \u201cis-ought\u201d problem. Second, Hunter and Nedelisky overlook the \u201cnaturalistic\nfallacy,\u201d which is related to but in this case more powerful than the\n\u201cis-ought\u201d distinction. Third, and most\nimportantly, Hunter and Nedelisky do not address the central question of\nmetaphysics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A good conversation partner here is Patricia Churchland.\u00a0 In her book Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us About Morality<\/a><\/em>, Churchland notes that Hume\u2019s \u201cis-ought\u201d rule is a narrow claim that refers to deductive logic.[2]<\/a>\u00a0 Churchland grants that an \u201cought\u201d statement cannot be derived from an \u201cis\u201d statement as a matter of formal logic.\u00a0 She argues, however, that \u201cought\u201d statements can be inferred<\/em> from \u201cis\u201d statements, \u201cdrawing on knowledge, perception, emotions, and understanding, and balancing considerations against each other.\u201d[3]<\/a>\u00a0 As Churchland notes, \u201cI ought to go to the dentist\u201d is a valid inference from the fact that \u201cI have a horrendous toothache.\u201d[4]<\/a>\u00a0 Similarly, Churchland suggests, more complex social practices, including moral behavior, usually develop through inferences from various facts rather than from cold deductive logic.[5]<\/a>\u00a0 Given Churchland\u2019s understanding of what an \u201cought\u201d can comprise, she escapes the \u201cis-ought\u201d rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The understanding of what an \u201cought\u201d can comprise, however,\nis the rub. Churchland\u2019s description of\nhow most people navigate moral issues certainly is correct, and in fact is\nconsistent with millennia of reflection on virtue ethics: ethical frameworks and moral choices are\nlived out in the complexity of the real world, not only in the sterile chamber\nof deductive logic. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Because of her commitment to naturalism, Churchland cannot\nrefer the \u201cought\u201d to higher purpose or end. \nInstead, she refers generally to human wellbeing and suggests that some\nkind of consequentialism is the best basis for legal rules that support human\nwellbeing.[6]<\/a> This seems to catch\nChurchland in a problem related to the \u201cis-ought\u201d rule \u2013 the naturalistic\nfallacy. As G.E. Moore first argued,\nhuman wellbeing, defined as health, pleasure, or any other property natural to\nhumans, cannot define the \u201cgood.\u201d[7]<\/a> As Moore noted, when people say \u201cPleasure is\ngood, we cannot believe that they merely mean Pleasure is pleasure and nothing\nmore than that.\u201d[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Churchland thinks Moore constructed a \u201cmystical moat around\nmoral behavior.\u201d[9]<\/a> Her response to the naturalistic fallacy is\nthat a scientific term can include more than one aspect of meaning. She suggests, \u201cconsider these scientifically\ndemonstrated identifications: light (A) is electromagnetic radiation (B), or\ntemperature (A) is mean molecular kinetic energy (B). Here, the A and B terms are not synonymous,\nbut the property measured one way was found to be the same as the property\nmeasured another way.\u201d[10]<\/a> As another more prosaic example, she suggest,\n\u201cSuppose I discover that my neighbor Bill Smith (A) is the head of the CIA (B):\nare the expressions \u2018my neighbor Bill Smith\u2019 and \u2018the head of the CIA\nsynonymous?\u2019 Of course not.\u201d[11]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Churchland is of course correct that a term can include more\nthan one aspect of meaning, but that is not what her examples demonstrate, and\nin any event, she completely misses Moore\u2019s point. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Churchland\u2019s second example is irrelevant. \u201cBill Smith\u201d and \u201cHead of the CIA\u201d are not\ncategories that overlap at all except for the contingent historical fact that\nat some point in time Bill Smith serves in that role. Obviously, Bill Smith cannot be reduced to\nhis role as Head of the CIA, nor can the role of Head of the CIA be reduced to\nthe individual who currently occupies it, Bill Smith. If Bill Smith ceases to serve as Head of the\nCIA, he will still be Bill Smith and there will still be a Head of the CIA. If anything, this example reinforces Moore\u2019s\narguments against reductionism. Not only\nare the terms not \u201csynonymous,\u201d they are not even close to coextensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Churchland\u2019s example of light and electromagnetic raditaion is\nno more availing. First, \u201cradiation\u201d is,\nin fact, a synonym for \u201clight.\u201d[12]<\/a> In at least one range of meaning \u2013\nparticularly the range of meaning employed by the natural sciences \u2013\n\u201celectromagnetic radiation\u201d does mean \u201clight\u201d and \u201clight\u201d does mean\n\u201celectromagnetic radiation,\u201d without remainder. \nSo, in the scientific domain that is Churchland\u2019s immediate concern,\nthis example belies her point. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cLight,\u201d of course, carries a much broader semantic range of\nmeaning than this narrow scientific one. \nTo say \u201cyou light up my life,\u201d for example, has nothing to do with\nelectromagnetic radiation. Churchland\nmight respond that the experience of having one\u2019s life lit up by a lover can be\ndescribed in the entirely material terms of hormones and neurochemistry. But this response only begs the question\nwhether a person\u2019s subjective conscious experience can be reduced to such\nmaterial terms. And, in any event, \u201clight\u201d\nnow signifies something very different than \u201celectromagnetic radiation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n The example of \u201ctemperature\u201d and \u201cmean molecular kinetic\nenergy,\u201d which invokes the Boltzmann constant, is more interesting. While it is true that the average kinetic\nenergy of molecules in a gas is proportional to temperature, mean molecular\nkinetic energy is not <\/em>a precise\nmeasure of some absolute quantity of temperature. A measurement of mean kinetic energy assumes\nthat every molecule in the gas acts like an independent point mass. This is important for measuring heat transfer\nand entropy. It is not, however, a real measure\nof the specific heat of a gas, because each molecule has some degree of freedom\nin its rotation and vibration and does not act like an independent point mass. Moreover, kinetic theory only applies to\ngases, and even for gases, is only one way of thinking about temperature. And things become even more interesting when\n\u201cquantum thermodynamics\u201d enters the picture, which raises major unresolved questions\nabout the relationship between the classical laws of thermodynamics and the\nthermodynamics of systems at the quantum level.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Even if Churchland wants to suggest something like \u201cmean molecular energy : temperature :: (individual brain\nchemistry + social evolution) : altruism,\u201d <\/a>the analogy breaks down on\nseveral levels. First, as discussed\nabove, the left side of the analogy only applies to one specific set of\nconditions. Moving to the right side of\nthe analogy, this would mean that \u201caltruism\u201d can be related to \u201cindividual\nbrain chemistry + social evolution\u201d only if \u201caltruism\u201d is used here in a unique\nway in relation to a specific kind of system. \nBut this would once again beg the question whether this relation\ndescribes anything about a real world or is only a specific, limited kind of\nmodel. And even if it were otherwise a\nfair model within its own limited sphere, it would leave open the question\nwhether, as with quantum thermodynamics, there are other levels of possible\ndescription, perhaps even with different rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This, however, is a quite generous account of the\nanalogy. Mean molecular energy and\ntemperature are related to each other proportionately, which is why one can be\nused to measure the other. Brain\nchemistry and evolution, in contrast, are not in the same kind of proportionate\nrelation to altruism or any other kind of ethically significant conduct. We can\u2019t take the mean level of serotonin in\nthe brains of humans in a society and come up with any predictable measure of\naltruism. Brains and social structures\nare too complex for correlations here, outside very broad normal distributions,\nmuch less for inferring causation between any discrete element of brain\nchemistry or social evolution and something like levels of altruism. The notion that there might be a Boltzmann\nconstant for moral behavior is statistically absurd.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, and most importantly, \u201cmean\nmolecular energy : temperature :: (individual brain chemistry + social\nevolution) : altruism,\u201d <\/a>is not really the right analogy. The right analogy is \u201cmean molecular energy :\ntemperature :: (individual brain chemistry + social evolution) : the goodness <\/em>of altruism.\u201d Again, the analogy breaks down here on its\nown terms. Behavior described as\naltruistic might be morally good, or morally bad, or morally indifferent, or\nany of these things under different circumstances. Measuring the sheer instances of a behavior\nis not a moral judgment. A moral\njudgment entails a measure of value the leads to some kind of imperative,\nprohibition, or exhortation: altruism is\ngood <\/em>so people ought<\/em> to be altruistic if they have extra and others are in need. No one says \u201cthat container of oxygen ought<\/em> to obey Boltzmann\u2019s constant or we\nwill judge it to be bad oxygen.\u201d The\noxygen has no agency and Boltzmann\u2019s constant invariably will apply in the\ndomain of classical physics. This means\nChurchland cannot avoid the naturalistic fallacy after all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It also hints at the deeper metaphysical questions Churchland\nrefuses to address. She describes the\nindividual components of each set — light (A) and electromagnetic radiation\n(B); and temperature (A) and mean molecular kinetic energy (B) \u2013 as\n\u201cproperties.\u201d As the Stanford\nEncyclopedia of Philosophy notes, however, \u201c[q]uestions about the nature and\nexistence of properties are nearly as old as philosophy itself.\u201d[14]<\/a> Any discussion of \u201cproperties\u201d invokes the\ndistinction between universals and particulars and other basic problems in\nmetaphysics and ontology.[15]<\/a> Churchland cannot dismiss these enormous\nmetaphysical problems with a hand-wave and then discourse about supposedly\ninterchangeable \u201cproperties\u201d of light and radiation. Yet this is exactly what she does, when she confidently\nasserts that \u201c[w]hat does not exist is a Platonic Heaven wherein the Moral\nTruths reside \u2013 no more than there is a Platonic Heaven wherein the Physical\nTruths reside.\u201d[16]<\/a> No contemporary philosopher would frame an\nanswer exactly as Plato did, but the question whether \u201cproperties\u201d are real,\nand whether any such realist claim can be justified absent immaterial entities,\nis the same kind of question Plato asked. [1]<\/a>\nJames Davidson Hunter and Paul Nedelisky, Science\nand the Good: The Tragic Quest for the Foundations of Morality<\/em> (New Haven:\nYale University Press 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a>\nPatricia Churchland, Braintrust: What\nNeuroscience Tells Us Abut Morality<\/em> (Princeton: Princeton University Press\n2011), 6-7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> Braintrust<\/em>, 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Braintrust<\/em>, 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Braintrust<\/em>, 8.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Brainstrust<\/em>, 175-181.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a>\nG.E. Moore, Principia Ethica<\/em>\n(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1903), \u00a7 10 \u00b6 3.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> Principia Ethica<\/em>, \u00a7\n11(2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a>\nChurchland, Brantrust<\/em>, 188.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> Braintrust<\/em>, 188.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Braintrust<\/em>, 188.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> See <\/em>Thesaurus.com, \u201clight,\u201d available at\nhttps:\/\/www.thesaurus.com\/browse\/light?s=t.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> See <\/em>Davide Castelvecchi, \u201cBattle Between\nQuantum and Thermodynamic Laws Heats Up,\u201d Nature<\/em>,\nMarch 30, 2017, available at https:\/\/www.scientificamerican.com\/article\/battle-between-quantum-and-thermodynamic-laws-heats-up\/<\/a>;\nNatalie Wolchover, \u201cThe Quantum Thermodynamics Revolution,\u201d Quanta Magazine<\/em>, May 2, 2017, available\nat https:\/\/www.quantamagazine.org\/the-quantum-thermodynamics-revolution-20170502\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, \u201cProperties<\/a>,\u201d available at https:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/properties\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> See <\/em>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,\n\u201cProperties.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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