Categories
Epistemology Theology

Proper Confidence

I’ve just finished reading Lesslie Newbigin’s Proper Confidence (Faith, Doubt & Certainty in Christian Discipleship). I reccomend it to anyone interested in how postmodern epistemology and Christian thought can or should interface.

I particularly appreciated Newbigin’s critique of the critical principle in Carteisan rationalism. As Newbigin succinctly defines it, the critical principle is that “[e]very truth claim must be open to criticism.” (Proper Confidence at p. 23.) He notes that this principle is self-refuting because it rests on its own presuppositional faith commitment: that all valid truth claims can ultimately be proven or disproven. The critical principle, in Newbigin’s view, should be secondary: “[t]he capacity to doubt, to question what seems obvious, is a necessary element in our effort toknow reality as it is, but its role is derivative and secondary. Rational doubt depends on faith; rational faith does not depend on doubt.” (Proper Confidence, at p. 25.) I agree with these conclusions, and I think they’re an important part of why we Evangelicals must reevaluate our commitment to rationalist foundationalism. Ultimately, as Newbigin concludes, rationalist foundationalism leads to extreme skepticism and nihlism, because nothing can be “proven” apart from any faith commitments.