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Epistemology

Evidentialism, Presuppositionalism, and Certainty

My buddy Jeff points out This Article on “certainty” by reformed professor Dr. John Frame. Frame is a “presuppositionalist” — according to his Wikipedia entry, he’s one of the foremost interpreters of Cornelius Van Til. There are certain aspects of presuppositionalism that I find very appealing. However, I think I’m more of an evidentialist, or at least something of a Thomist when it comes to natural law. (For the distinction between presuppositionalism and evidentialism, see this adequate but thin Wiki. Anyway, the Frame article raised some interesting questions on one of my favorite subjects — epistemology and Christian faith — and here are my thoughts.

Frame’s article on “Certainty” is certainly 🙂 interesting. I’ve heard of Frame but don’t know much about him. Frame’s argument is coherent within the presuppositionalist framework, but I don’t know how it fares if that framework isn’t assumed.

For example, Frame says: “Our certainty of the truth of God comes ultimately, not through rational demonstration or empirical verification, useful as these may often be, but from the authority of God’s own word.” This is obviously circular: we can be certain of God because of his word, and we can be certain of his word because he is God. So, Frame says, along with other presuppositionalists, that the only way to apprehend and have “psychological certainty” of the truth of God is through divine grace.

I hadn’t really thought of it this way before, but some of our discussion of “certainty” is really a discussion of evidentialism and presuppositionalism. If you are a presuppositionalist, you can be “absolutely certain” of your beliefs in a sense by fiat. If you are an evidentialist, you ultimately have to acknowledge that the evidence can only go so far — it can show that belief in God is “probable” or “reasonable,” but not “absolutely certain” in the ordinary usage of “absolute.” You can also define “absolute” as modest foundationalists do to mean something less than truly “absolute,” such as “properly warranted”.

In any of these three cases, the use of the word “certainty” seems potentially misleading. The presuppositionalist can say “I feel certain” and the evidientialist can at best say “I am ‘certain’ in the sense that my beliefs have adequate warrant given the limitations of my perception and knowledge.”

Since I’m becoming more and more of a “natural law” theorist (studying Thomistic thought for a paper I’m now writing on virtue ethics and patent law), I’d have to say that I wouldn’t place myself squarely in the presuppositionalist camp. I particularly don’t like Frame’s emphasis on “psychological certainty,” since it seems to leave little room for grace to work in those who suffer periodically (like me) from depression and anxiety. There are days when I’m quite certain psychologically, and days when I’m at the bottom of the pit, and days in between. I don’t think those variable emotions define my faith.

I do agree, though, that there is ontological “certainty” — a reality beyond our social and linguistic constructions — and that we can have varying degrees of “certainty” that our beliefs correspond to that reality. But I don’t think there’s any way a human being can possess any such thing as complete, “absolute” epistemic “certainty” in this life. Uncertainty is part of being human; faith entails commitment despite uncertainty.

22 replies on “Evidentialism, Presuppositionalism, and Certainty”

“From this article, I’m gathering that he’s a Van Tillian presuppositionalist?”

True. A student of Van Til. He did the unthinkable, however. He criticized Van Til (not in the article you read, mind you). True Van Til followers have never forgiven him. Greg Bahnsen (who passed away in 1996) was the truest torch bearer for Van Til. I don’t know who wears that mantle now — I guess it is Frame, by default. Though I do have several Van Tilian friends in my church who are truer Van Tilians than Frame 🙂

“His argument is coherent within that framework, but I don’t know how it fares if that framework isn’t assumed.”

Van Tilians would argue that Romans 1 guarantees that the Biblical framework will always be rejected by the non-elect.

1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. 19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. 20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse.

That is old news. I mean how many of the non-elect do you know who rely on the Bible as their rule for faith and living? I don’t know any 🙂

“This is obviously circular: we can be certain of God because of his word, and we can be certain of his word because he is God.”

Yep. Please demonstrate how rationalism is not guilty of its own circularity. Seeing how you reject modernity and foundationalism, I am sure you agree that man’s rationality as the ultimate arbiter of truth is just as question begging as Frame’s view. In the end, circularity is not the grenade it appears to be. Circularity turns out to be a marshmellow.

“If you are an evidentialist, you ultimately have to acknowledge that the evidence can only go so far — it can show that belief in God is “probable” or “reasonable”

True. For the evidentialist, God is probably true. We worship a God who might exist? Not a very high view of God, is it?

“Since I’m becoming more and more of a “natural law” theorist (studying Thomistic thought for a paper I’m now writing on virtue ethics and patent law), I’d have to say that I wouldn’t place myself squarely in the presuppositionalist camp.”

Again, true. Natural law does not fit at all in a reformed framework (as near as I can tell). The reformed view of the fall says that it affects every aspect of man — including his knowing (i.e. noetic effects). Natural law assumes that there are things we all “can’t not know” — so it takes a high view of man’s knowing. It seems to presuppose that man’s ability to know moral truth did not get completely tainted by the fall. That is my “thin slice”. I have not done any detailed study on how reformed theologians (like Calvin) evaluated Aquinas’ views on natural law.

“But I don’t think there’s any way a human being can possess any such thing as complete, “absolute” epistemic “certainty” in this life.”

That is a core value for you, hence the name of your blog. Frame suggests that we can have it — as a divine gift. Now what does that mean? In Frame’s view, did you (as someone who does not have epistemic certainty) not get this gift? Can you pray and ask God to give it to you? Interesting questions to ponder.

I mean how many of the non-elect do you know who rely on the Bible as their rule for faith and living? I don’t know any 🙂

Right, but many, many people rely on Biblical principles as a rule for ethics and living. This is exactly as natural law theory would suggest, since the Bible’s moral principles aren’t merely arbitrary, but are part of the fabric of creation and thus apprehendable to reason.

Yep. Please demonstrate how rationalism is not guilty of its own circularity.

I don’t defend rationalism.

Seeing how you reject modernity and foundationalism, I am sure you agree that man’s rationality as the ultimate arbiter of truth is just as question begging as Frame’s view. In the end, circularity is not the grenade it appears to be. Circularity turns out to be a marshmellow.

But it is a grenade. It blows up both fideism (strong presuppositionalism) and rationalism. I don’t, BTW, completely reject modernity and foundationalism, but rather I accept certain critiques of both. Without commiting myself to strongly just yet, I lean towards a “critical realist” position. Here is how theologian Tom Wright describes that position:

I propose a form of critical realism. This is a way of describing the process of “knowing” that acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence “realism”), while fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence “critical”). (The New Testament and the People of God, pp. 35)

True. For the evidentialist, God is probably true. We worship a God who might exist? Not a very high view of God, is it?

No, no, no. We worship a God whom we believe exists. Our belief is strongly warranted by various lines of evidence. The existence of God does not depend one way or the other on whether we believe in Him or not. Thus, the evidentialist position doesn’t compromise a high view of God. Rather, it presents an appropriate view of man. As a man, my knowledge and perception are limited. I cannot arrogate to myself the sort of “certainty” that belongs only to God. Don’t confuse ontology and epistemology.

So I would turn this around: you are as certain of your beliefs as God is of His beliefs? An excessively high view of man, don’t you think?

Frame suggests that we can have it — as a divine gift. Now what does that mean? In Frame’s view, did you (as someone who does not have epistemic certainty) not get this gift? Can you pray and ask God to give it to you? Interesting questions to ponder.

After all the discussions we’ve had about different things, are you trying to evangelize me??? Are you suggesting I’m not a real Christian??? Please tell me this is tongue-in-cheek.

Here’s what I think: Frame is wrong to make “faith” or the evidence of faith dependent on human emotions. This way of thinking about election and faith is why so many of those 17th-Century Calvinists agonized over the fate of their souls. Frame’s way of thinking (at least as expressed in this one essay) is intended to give assurance, but at the end of the day it robs all but the most arrogant and cocksure people of real assurance. Assurance comes from God’s unchanging promises, not from our changing emotions.

“After all the discussions we’ve had about different things, are you trying to evangelize me??? Are you suggesting I’m not a real Christian??? Please tell me this is tongue-in-cheek.”

Tongue-in-cheek.

I am trying to work through all the implications of Van Til’s presuppositionalism myself.

Just thinking out loud, really. Sorry to stress you out 🙂

I don’t really know how Frame or Van Tilians would answer the question I threw out.

The question would be something like …

“If I lack epistemic certainty about God’s existence, His character etc. … then does that automatically mean I am not one of the elect?

Or, does it just mean that I am one of the elect, and I am confused about epistemology?”

…something to that effect.

Not really sure how to word it … but Frame seems to suggest certainty is a divine gift … but clearly there are Christians who don’t have it … so how does that work? (asking rhetorically, not looking for an answer from you)

… hmmm… ignore prior question … rewording …

So just how damaged (by The Fall) is man’s cognitive ability to reason about the things of God (like the moral laws that are grounded in God’s holy character), in your view?

“We worship a God whom we believe exists.”

The evidentialist can say they believe, but they must admit that they can’t be certain of their belief. Which means, there is a chance that they are wrong and God may not exist after all. Right?

I don’t see how separating knowing (epistemology) and being (ontology) frees the evidentialist from (in effect) reducing his statement of belief of God’s existence to probabilities.

In other words, how can he assert with dogmatic certainty that from an ontological perspective, God exists … but from an epistemic perspective, he might be wrong, even though there is good evidence to suggest he is right.

I am clearly missing your meaning … sorry for my thickness.

“So I would turn this around: you are as certain of your beliefs as God is of His beliefs? An excessively high view of man, don’t you think?”

Actually, an excessively high view of the Holy Spirit.

Man is not accomplishing the certainty — God grants it to man through the Holy Spirit.

Therefore, it is still a high view of God.

“Frame is wrong to make “faith” or the evidence of faith dependent on human emotions.”

One of us has misunderstood what Frame is saying. It might be me … so I will go back and double check to make sure I read him correctly.

Just thinking out loud, really. Sorry to stress you out 🙂

Phew! Thanks.

Not really sure how to word it … but Frame seems to suggest certainty is a divine gift … but clearly there are Christians who don’t have it … so how does that work? (asking rhetorically, not looking for an answer from you)

I think we need to separate out the idea of the “assurance of faith” from epistemology generally. Anyone who genuinely has faith in Christ receives the Holy Spirit. As Romans 8:16 indicates, one of the ministries of the Holy Spirit is to confirm our faith: “The Spirit himself testifies with our spirit that we are God’s children.” As the context of Romans 8 makes clear, this testimony of the Holy Spirit involves assuring us that we are no longer under slavery to sin, but that we rather have been adopted by God as sons. So, I do think that in the life of every Christian, there must be some inward sense of one’s changed relationship to sin and to God.

I think, though, that the assurance of faith spoken of in Romans 8 is very different than the notion of “epistemic certainty.” I don’t think that anything in Paul’s teaching, or elsewhere in the NT, promises us the sort of certainty about things that God possesses. Ultimately, the security of our salvation is based not on ourselves, including our own knowledge, but on God. We are exhorted repeatedly not to worry, to persevere, and to continue in the faith precisely, I believe, because of our human limitations, including the limitations of our knowledge. And you’re right, the them of my blog, from 1 Cor. 13:12, is a strong statement about these limitations. Our status in this life is not so much as gods astride the sea, but as shipwreck survivors clining to a life raft, confident in the hope we will reach the land in sight, but realizing that we’re not yet there.

So just how damaged (by The Fall) is reason, in your view?

Not sure — this is something I’m thinking through. I don’t think the Biblical view, however, is that reason is so damaged that unregenerate people are utterly incapable of apprehending truths about moral principles or God. OTOH, I do think the Biblical view is that no one can entirely reason his or her way to God without the gift of faith. I see reason and faith as complementary.

In other words, how can he assert with dogmatic certainty that from an ontological perspective, God exists … but from an epistemic perspective, he might be wrong, even though there is good evidence to suggest he is right.

I think that’s correct, but what’s wrong with that? This is the human condition. We “know in part” as Paul says.

Here’s where I think we’re getting confused: I grant that it would be a serious problem if I were to say that allowing for the possibility (however remote) that God might not exist means all assertions about God, and all value judgments based in belief in God, are merely relative. This is where the separation of epistemology and ontology comes in. The fact that we can’t percieve or describe Reality perfectly or with absolute indubitability doesn’t imply that there’s no such thing as Reality. It is reasonable and right to act based on beliefs about objective Truth even if we have to acknowledge that our knowledge of that Truth is imperfect and subject at least at some level to question. The issue then is not “are you unquestionably certain about this belief” but rather “do you have adequate warrant for this belief.”

Actually, an excessively high view of the Holy Spirit.

Maybe, but here’s the problem: how do you known that it’s the Holy Spirit and not a deceptive spirit, or a physchological state with naturalistic explanations? It seems to me that at some point you have to flesh this out with reason. I believe it’s the Holy Spirit because it connects rationally to other things I believe about who God is, how He made us, how we relate to Him and He relates to us, how He has revealed Himself to us, what His revelation says and means, and so on. But if your reason is so utterly defective that you can’t trust it, how can you know that any of this chain of reasoning is true? If you say that knowledge comes from the Holy Spirit’s regeneration of your reason, you’re back to square one. There’s an infinite regress here, such that what supposedly is beyond question is clearly questionable.

The other major problem I have with what I guess would be considered “strong” presuppositionalism is that it seems to provide no basis for Christian influence in the public square in a pluralistic democracy. How can I discuss what is a just public policy if my response is completely inacessible to any non-Christian? How can I even support the concept of democracy if the majority of people have no access to the correct presuppositions need for true knowledge? Because of this, I think there can be a connection between presuppositionalism and reconstructionism, which disturbs me. At the fringes, the idea that “I know things you can’t know because I have a connection with God you lack, and my knowledge of these things is absolutely certain and beyond question” becomes the stuff of Al Queda.

How is your view not circular?

Because it acknowledges that human beings don’t possess absolute, unquestionable certainty about anything, at least not in the way that God does. So, you will ask, “how are you certain of that?” I suppose the honest answer will have to be that I’m not. But, based on the long history of human experience, the application of reason to that empirical data, and a Biblical view of the nature of humanity and the nature of God, I think my assertion here is well warranted.

Good thoughtful answers, David. A lot to think about.

This conversation you and I are having is exactly where my mind share has been focused for the last several years (well, more recently it has been focused on the whole “missional” thing … but before that it was on this stuff).

I’ll try to respond later …

A good luck, my friend, in fighting off the spam bots that are attacking your blog right now.

A good luck, my friend, in fighting off the spam bots that are attacking your blog right now.

Which never attacked current threads until you started posting on this one. Hmmm…. 🙂

“Which never attacked current threads until you started posting on this one.”

Are you absolutely certain I am the cause 😉

David,

If you are really serious about exploring this topic, Ken Boa and Robert Bowman have produced an unbelievably good book on apologetics (not just reformed apologetics, but all forms including evidentialism).

I paid about $30 for my copy and I consider that a bargain since it is the most used apologetics book I own. It is called Faith Has Its Reasons.

Here is the crazy part. The authors have made it available for free.

Go here :

http://www.bible.org/series.asp?series_id=190

Download the zip file.

Chapters 14 through 16 deal with Reformed apologetics. I’ll go ahead and cut and paste from those chapters in our thread here — but you would be better served by reading those 4 chapters.

From Chapter 14:

“Fundamental to classical apologetics and evidentialism are their respective approaches to epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Putting the matter rather broadly, classical apologetics is indebted largely to the rationalist tradition in Western philosophy, while evidentialism is indebted to the empiricist tradition. Now this characterization immediately requires qualification. Few if any classical apologists have been pure rationalists, and few (though some) evidentialists have been thoroughgoing empiricists. Nearly all apologists of both approaches today would favor some epistemology that combined elements of rationalism and empiricism and avoided the extremes of both theories.

Reformed apologists, on the other hand, believe a different approach to epistemology is in order. They typically reject not only rationalism and empiricism but also any epistemology that seeks to combine the two theories, as all these epistemologies in their different ways treat human knowledge as self-sufficient or autonomous. That is, rationalism, empiricism, and other such epistemologies attempt to explain how human beings can gain knowledge without reference to God and man’s relationship to God. According to Van Til, there are ultimately only two kinds of epistemologies: those that make all human knowledge dependent on God and those that do not. “In the last analysis we shall have to choose between two theories of knowledge. According to one theory God is the final court of appeal; according to the other theory man is the final court of appeal.”

This is wordy (sorry) … it deals with probability -vs- certainty.

“The basic difference between the approaches to historical evidences of presuppositionalists on the one hand and classical and evidentialist apologists on the other hand is that the former reason transcendentally about the facts while the latter reason inductively about them. Consequently, presuppositionalists claim that their apologetic argument yields absolute certainty for their knowledge of the historical facts of the Bible, whereas traditional apologetic arguments yield only probability. Presuppositionalists, in fact, consistently criticize apologetic arguments that conclude that this or that biblical event or claim is “probably” true. To the criticism that historical investigation by its very nature cannot rise above probability in its findings, Greg Bahnsen makes the following telling reply:

This kind of criticism [against probabilistic arguments] is often answered by saying that historical facts (especially miraculous ones), just because they are such, cannot be known with any more than a high degree of probability. Such an opinion is contrary to God’s inspired word, however. Peter proclaimed this historical event (and miracle): “Let all the house of Israel therefore know with certainty that God has made him Lord” by raising Jesus from the dead (Acts 2:24, 36). He did not say that it was highly probable that Christ rose from the dead, but rather that it was “not possible” that death could hold him (v. 24).

Bahnsen’s defense of the presuppositionalist rejection of probabilistic apologetic arguments makes it clear that his approach to historical evidences does not proceed inductively. That is, we do not “know with certainty” that God raised Jesus from the dead because we have studied the historical evidence inductively. We know it with certainty because if we were to deny it, we would implicitly be denying the Christian theistic revelation, apart from which we have no coherent basis for knowing anything in history.”

“The other major problem I have with what I guess would be considered “strong” presuppositionalism is that it seems to provide no basis for Christian influence in the public square in a pluralistic democracy. How can I discuss what is a just public policy if my response is completely inacessible to any non-Christian?”

This is a good point. Many strong presupps are post-mil in their eschatology. Some, like Bahnsen was, are theonomists. I suppose a lot of these issues flow directly out of one’s systematic theology : dispensational, covenantal etc.

Personally, I am covenantal and amillenial. I try to follow Francis Schaeffer’s model of presuppositionalism / evangelism. It is sort of a slightly watered down version of Van Til’s transcendtal presupp approach (Schaeffer was also a student of Van Til’s at Westminster, btw).

Schaeffer seemed to reason persuasively with non-Christians, primarily by showing them the logical outworking of their presuppositions. That takes into accounts worldviews — but at the same time, it recognizes that non-Christians share the same world as Christians — the laws of logic and reason work well for Christians and non-Christians alike. It also assumes that if the Holy Spirit is regenerating the heart of the unbeliever, then they will respond to capital T truth. One other thing which I like. Schaeffer employed hospitality and community as part of his evangelism. I really like that. I think our witness as to be a both – and kinda thing (words and life).

In terms of public policy, I would argue we are to pursue policies which promote justice and preserve order. Those policies will be based, of course, on natural law. I am bound to pursue issues of justice and order because of my allegiance to King Jesus and his Kingdom — not because of any other allegiance (like to an ideal of a pluralistic democracy etc). It is both an obedience issue and a kingdom issue.

That is how I personally cash out your issue regarding public policy.

(sorry for leaving such wordy comments on your blog — have a great weekend and I hope your son is doing well).

Jeff,

Thanks for all this stuff. The download book looks great. Please don’t fret about leaving “wordy” comments — particularly given the tomes I often leave on your site!

Very briefly skimming the I-book, probably what I actually tend to do almost subconsciously is to adopt a blended apologetic that takes some elements from each basic approach. But I need to read through this a bit more.

As to Bahnsen’s exegisis of Acts 2:36, I need to research it some more, but at first glance it doesn’t strike me that this passage is a strong foundation for an entire epistemology of “certainty.” Acts 2 is not a general discussion of faith and knowledge, nor is it an easy passage from which to infer such a general principle because of the context.

The context of Acts 2 is the events of Pentecost. The particular verses Bahnsen cites constitute a proclamation by Peter to Israel, upon the innaguration of the Church at Pentecost, that Jesus is the messiah, “both Lord and Christ.”

Though Bahnsen cites the translation of the key phrase as “know with certainty,” the KJV translates it “know assuredly” and the NIV translates it “Let all Israel be assured of this.” The relevant Greek word is “asphalos,” meaning “securely” or “safely (so as to prevent escape)”.

It seems to me, then, that in Acts 2 Peter is proclaiming to the nation of Israel that the resurrection of Jesus is the confirmatory sign that Jesus indeed is the Messiah. This makes sense in the context, since the other events of Pentecost (the howling wind, the tongues of fire, and speaking in tongues) were signs that the Holy Spirit had come to innagurate the Church. The implication of this is that Israel as a nation is no longer in itself the chosen people. The chosen people and the heirs to God’s promises to Abraham now comprises (or at least includes, if you’re dispensational) the Church.

Two observations I might make from this reading are:

1. The use of “asphalos” here isn’t to state some general principle of epistemic certainty, but rather to make emphatic the point that Israel is now accountable to accept or reject Jesus as Messiah. I think the usage is kind of like if I say to my wife “You can be sure of this honey: I said “I do” in front of all those witnesses, I meant it, I love you with all my heart, and I’ll never leave you.” She can indeed (I hope) be “sure” of that based on my past actions towards her and the convictions of her heart about the matter. She is warranted in her belief about my commitment to her, and can make fundamental decisions about how to live based on that belief. But she can’t be “absolutely certain,” with God-like certainty, that my statements are true. Only a being with perfect foreknowledge and omnicscience could possess that kind of certainty. She must allow that it is possible, even if that possibility is remote and not worth considering as a practical matter, that I may leave her someday.

and

2. The sign of Jesus’ resurrection is given as evidence of his Messiahship. The apologetic Peter seems to employ, then, is more evidentialist than presuppositional.

Thoughts?

Jeff,

The expression “not possible” seems awfully dogmatic of Peter, true? It approaches God-like certainty

But again, that takes Peter’s statement out of context. It isn’t a statement of Peter’s knowledge of the event. This passage isn’t teaching anything about the extent or certainty of human knowledge. Peter is simply saying, using ordinary language, that death could not defeat Jesus becaue Jesus is God. It’s bad hermeneutics to transform this sort of everyday idiom into some sort of technical usage. Bahnsen reads way too much into this general statement.

Now, I will grant you that in this passage and in many other places throughout scripture, the Bible doesn’t present the facts of the Gospel as only “possibilities.” But that is a question of purpose and genre. In Acts 2, the Gospel is proclaimed in scripture, not studied. The purpose and genre of the passage aren’t to discuss the niceties of epistemology.

The stronger passage for a concept of “certainty” in scripture would seem to be Luke 1:3, in which Luke tells Theophilus that Luke’s account is written “so that you [Theophilus] may know the certainty of the things you have been taught.” But this passage also would seem to cut against a presuppositional apologetic, since the basis for Luke’s statement is the evidence he will present in the text.

The word translated “certainty” in Luke 1:3, by the way, is “asphaleia”, which is related to the word “asphalos” in Acts 2. Again, the underlying concept of this word is to make safe or secure. For example, “asphalos” is used in Acts 16:23, where the jailer is told to guard Paul and Silas “carefully”, and in Mark 14:44 Judas tells the Romans to lead Jesus away “under guard” once Judas delivers the betrayer’s kiss. As I understand it, in classical Greek thought, “asphaleia” is the concept of political security (see reference here).

So, in Luke 1, Luke is offering the testimony of his writings to provide secure evidence for the faith. Our faith is not based on fables or wishful thinking; it’s grounded in history. I would agree that this says something about how we should understand the text, and also about the nature of evidence and faith. It does cut against the sort of postmodern Continental literary theory that says texts have no meaning and that reality is “constructed” rather than “known.”

However, again, I don’t think Luke 1 is intended as any kind of technical statement on epistemology generally. If we try to read from this that human beings can know things with God-like certainty, we’re reading our Enlightenment-influenced ideas into it, and we’re ignoring other parts of scripture that speak of man’s limitations.

While Peter’s sermon in Acts is not a sermon about certainty, neither is Paul’s discussion of spiritual gifts in 1 Cor 13 a treatise on epistemology.

Agreed. But just as we can draw some implications for epistemology from Luke 1, so also we can draw some implications for epistemology from 1 Cor. 13.

Taken in context, this discussion of knowledge is simply Paul showing the supremacy of love when juxtaposed against something Paul knew the Corinthians (and all Greeks) prized highly … which was gnosis … knowledge. In my opinion, 1 Cor 13:12 is not an indictment on certainty … it is a glorious proclamation of the supremacy of love.

I agree that 1 Cor. 13 is primarily about the supremacy of love, particularly over against the supposed secret knowledge of the gnostics. I also agree that it’s purpose isn’t as an “indictment” of certainty or the possibility of knowledge. However, it clearly is a reference to the limits of human knowledge in this life. And this is consistent with the Biblical theme of God’s transcendence. For example, Isaiah 55:8-9 famously states:

For my thoughts are not your thoughts,
neither are your ways my ways,”
declares the LORD.

“As the heavens are higher than the earth,
so are my ways higher than your ways
and my thoughts than your thoughts.”

This theme is also evident in God’s answers to Job, as well as in many places in the Psalms.

And if you have trouble seeing something with your eyeballs, it does affect your awareness of something.

Absolutely. And that’s why I think 1. Cor. 13 does say something about the limits of human knowledge, consistent with the theme of God’s transcendence that I mentioned above. We simply don’t see everything as God does. Our knowledge is contingent on our imperfect “sight.” Therefore, our knowledge is unquestionably “limited” and not “absolute.”

If he had not healed the paralytic, they would have questioned his power and authority. The greek verb is eido.

And the basic meaning of “eido” is “to see” or “perceive.” So, yes, Jesus performed miracles so that people could see, perceive, “know” or “have assurance” that he is God. But again, the fact that in ordinary usage we can “see” the evidence that Jesus is God doesn’t imply that our “sight” is absolute or perfect in some abstract sense just like God’s. If that were the implication, 1. Cor. 13 (as well as Isaiah 55 and all of God’s answers to Job) would constitute a contradiction.

The presupp can say that the interpreting the evidence correctly requires the right presuppositions.

This I certainly (oops!) agree with. One thing I like about presuppositionalism is that it recognizes something inherent in the postmodern critique of modernism: all observations are theory-laden.

The truth is, I’m not sure we’re terribly far apart here.

“The truth is, I’m not sure we’re terribly far apart here.”

I agree. IMO, it seems to me that what bothers you is arrogance. And, you equate certainty with arrogance. So it is the heart attitude that sticks in your craw.

If someone combined certainty with humility, like Jesus did, I don’t think you would find it offensive.

Am I wrong?

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