Cur Deus Homo was written by St. Anselm of Canterbury, a philosopher and theologian who lived in the eleventh century. It is a rational defense of the necessity of Christ’s incarnation for human salvation.[1]This document is historically significant because it is one of the most complete early expositions of the “satisfaction / substitutionary” theory of the atonement, which has been the principal model of the atonement in the Western (both Roman Catholic and Reformed) theological tradition. This view of the atonement was regarded by Anselm, and by the Western Church, as superior to Patristic “ransom” theories that viewed Christ’s death as a payment to the Devil to free man from sin.
The text is structured as a fictional philosophical dialogue between Anselm and Boso, a monk in Normandy.[2] In Book One, Anselm explains why God could not have offered salvation to humanity other than through Christ. Boso notes that if God is all-powerful, God should have been able to save man simply by fiat.[3] Boso raises the further objection that the Divine, being transcendent and impassible, cannot become a finite human being.[4] In addition, Boso suggests, even if God could have a “son” it would be unjust for God to punish that individual for all the sins of humanity.[5] All of these were common pagan objections to the incarnation dating from the time of Augustine and earlier.[6]
Anselm responds to the problem of divine impassibility with reference to Chalcedonian Christology.Christ’s suffering was incurred “in the feebleness of the human constitution which he assumed,” not in the “majesty” of his divine nature.[7] On the charge of injustice, Anselm notes that Christ suffered of his own will, not under Divine compulsion.
In response, Boso questions the voluntariness of Christ’s suffering, given that Christ is portrayed in scripture as perfectly obedient to God’s will “even unto death.”[8] Anselm responds that true “obedience” is not compelled, but freely offered. Further, Anselm says, God did not specifically command Christ’s death.[9] Rather, Christ was put to death by an act of human will by people who could not tolerate Christ’s lifestyle of holy obedience to God’s moral commands.[10] Yet, God was willing to allow this terrible act – to allow the Son to choose obedience unto death – because through this obedience humanity could be saved.[11]
The discourse then moves to a discussion of the nature of sin and why Christ’s death was necessary to account for human sin.[12] Sin, Anselm asserts, is an assertion of autonomy from God that impinges on God’s honor. This creates a debt owed by the sinner: “everyone who sins ought to pay back the honor of which he has robbed God; and this is the satisfaction which every sinner owes to God.”[13]
Moreover, the dishonor to God resulting from sin creates an injustice that requires punishment. If God is just, He must punish sin. God’s justice, then, answers the earlier question why God cannot simply excuse sin by a mere act of will.[14] It is a question of God’s dignity and character, not of his power. In this way, Anselm brilliantly turns on its head the pagan Divine-dignity argument against the incarnation.
Anselm continues the thread of his argument to explain why satisfaction for human sin must be made only by a human.[15] Here, Anselm turns to a discussion of the creation and fall of angels and men.God planned to create a “reasonable and complete number” of rational beings who would enjoy eternal happiness in the contemplation of God.[16] Even if no angel had ever fallen, God left room for the creation of some number of men to perfect the number of those rational beings who would contemplate God forever.The original purpose of man was to multiply until the number was perfected. Thus, humanity was originally created in a holy state in which it was require to persevere until the number of rational beings was completed.[17] However, both angels and men sinned, and therefore the perfection God desired for creation cannot be attained without some remedy for sin.
But why is it that, if man sinned, man cannot remedy his own sin? Anselm argues that the duty of honor men owe to God is complete and continual.[18] The execution of an ongoing duty cannot constitute payment for a past failure to exercise that duty.[19] Moreover, the debt of sin is so great that man is not capable of making payment on top of the duties already owed to God. When Boso suggests otherwise, Anselm famously states, “[y]ou have not as yet estimated the great burden of sin.”[20]
Nevertheless, Anselm argues, God could not simply leave man to his punishment, because God made man for happiness in the contemplation of God, and therefore God’s purpose would have been frustrated by man’s sin.[21] Yet, human beings are not able to pay the penalty for their own sin. Thus, Anselm explains, God became incarnate in Christ, the God-man, to pay the penalty on man’s behalf.[22]
But why did God have to become man? Anselm shows why a man of “Adam’s race” must make atonement. Humanity fell in Adam and therefore must be reinstated by a man of Adam’s race.[23] At the same time, human limitations preclude a mere human from making atonement. A person who can make a perfect payment for sin must be perfect. Yet, how was Christ perfect if he took on human limitations, including the imperfection of death?
Anselm responds that death is not an essential attribute of human nature in its uncorrupted stated.[24] Whereas death is a punishment for sin for ordinary men, for the God-man death is merely a possibility, one which he chooses to endure.[25] Moreover, the virtue inherent in this sacrifice – a voluntary choice made on behalf of all of the race of men – is so powerful that it “is extended even to those far remote in place or time.”[26]
How is this virtue extended? Christ’s sacrifice merits the reward of the restoration of fellowship with God by providing the price of the dishonor done to God by man’s sin. Yet Christ himself, being the perfect God-man, “needs nothing . . . no gift or release.”[27] This reward would go to waste if Christ did not transfer it to someone else.[28] The Son is free to give this reward as a gift to whomever he wishes. It is graciously given by Christ to man.
Discussion
Anselm’s discussion of the incarnation and the atonement is rich, analytically sharp, and to me almost lyrical in some places. Contrary to the arguments of many contemporary critics of the satisfaction theory of the atonement, Anselm’s treatment does not make God appear bloodthirsty or vicious. Indeed, I think Anselm amply demonstrates why anything less than “satisfaction” of the grave dishonor done by the sinful assertion of human autonomy fails the test of justice.
Anselm’s argument is somewhat weakened for me, however, by his conceptual debt to Platonic thought-forms. I personally find aesthetic arguments attractive, but Anselm uses the Platonic notion of perfection to prove too much in regard to the need for the atonement to enable completion of the number of the elect. This is particularly so, I think, in his discussion of the number of fallen angels in relation to the number of elect humans. This is the kind of thing for which scholastic theology earned its “angels on the head of a pin” reputation.
I also am not sure what to make of Anselm’s views on the incarnation vis-a-vis Divine impassibility.I find some of Jurgen Moltmann’s views about God’s relationship to the creation and the purpose of the atonement interesting in this regard. Moltmann argues that God truly suffers along with the creation as it evolves, and that the atonement demonstrates the cruciform character of God’s relationship with the entire creation. In some ways, Moltmann’s approach offers a more compelling theodicy than Anselm’s, because our understanding of the natural world has moved far beyond the static categories of Plato and Aristotle. At the same time, Moltmann has been justly criticized for having views of the trinity and the incarnation that border on, if not transgress into, the territory of heresy in minimizing the unity of the Godhead and the transcendence of the Father. I also would repeat Anselm’s great dictum to Motlmann and his admirers: “[y]ou have not as yet estimated the great burden of sin.” However we decouple it from Plato, the substitutionary aspect of the atonement seems to me necessary and central.
[1] Anselm claims his work “proves, by absolute reasons” and “by plain reasoning” that no one can be saved without Christ and that the incarnation was necessary for human salvation. See Cur Deus Homo, Preface.
[2] Some people argue, somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that Anselm’s use of Boso as a rhetorical foil prefigures Bozo the Clown. See “The First Bozo Probably Wasn’t a Clown,” New York Times, August 16, 1991, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D0CEFDE1339F935A2575BC0A967958260.
[3] Cur Deus Homo, Book One, Ch. VI.
[4] Id., Book One, Ch. VIII.
[5] Id.
[6] See, e.g., Augustine’s responses to similar objections in City of God and Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho.
[7] Cur Deus Homo, Book One, Ch. VI. As noted in my conclusion, one wonders whether Anselm would have done better to question the Platonic presupposition about Divine impassibility.
[8] Id., Chapter IX.
[9] Id.
[10] Anselm argues that “God did not, therefore, compel Christ to die; but he suffered death of his own will, not yielding up his life as an act of obedience, but on account of his obedience in maintaining holiness; for he held out so firmly in this obedience that he met death on account of it.” Id.
[11] Id., Chapter IX – X. Curiously, Anselm seems to depart in the course of this argument from his prior affirmation of Divine impassibility. See, e.g., Ch. X, stating “it is proper to say that [the Father] wished the Son to endure death so piously and for so great an object, though he was not pleased with [the Son’s] suffering.” If the Father is impassible, one wonders how he apparently felt compassion or empathy for the Son’s suffering.
[12] Id., Chapter XI – XII.
[13] Id., Chapter XI.
[14] Id. See also Chapter XV: “satisfaction or punishment must needs follow every sin.”
[15] Id., Chapter XVI.
[16] Id. This discussion, which seems quite strange to modern ears, draws on Platonic notions of perfection. For a discussion of Anselm’s reliance on Platonic thought forms, see “Anselm of Cantebury,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anselm/.
[17] Id., Chapter XVIII.
[18] Id., Chapter XX.
[19] Anselm says, “[w]hen you render anything to God which you owe him, irrespective of your past sin, you should not reckon this as the debt which you owe for sin.” Id.
[20] Id., Chapter XXI.
[21] Id., Chapter XXV.
[22] Anselm says “[if] it be necessary, therefore, as it appears, that the heavenly kingdom be made up of men, and this cannot be effected unless the aforesaid satisfaction be made, which not but God can make and none but man ought to make, it is necessary for the God-man to make it.” Cur Deus Homo, Book Two, Chapter VI.
[23] Id., Chapter VIII (stating “if the race of Adam be reinstated by any being not of the same race, it will not be restored to that dignity which it would have had, had not Adam sinned, and so will not be completely restored; and besides, God will seem to have failed of his purpose, both of which suppositions are incongruous. . . .”).
[24] Id., Chapter XI (stating “neither corruption nor incorruption belongs essentially to human nature, for neither makes nor destroys a man. . . .”).
[25] As Anselm notes, it was in a sense not possible for Christ to make a different choice, but this is because of his holy and loving character, not because of any external compulsion. See Id., Chapter XVIII(a).
[26] Id., Chapter XVI.
[27] Id., Chapter XIX.
[28] Id.