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Epistemology Spirituality

Contending for the Truth

This little gem is one of the readings in my Isaac of Syria reader. I’m not sure I can take Isaac completely literally here. It’s interesting that Isaac is contending that we shouldn’t “contend” for truth. He therefore certainly can’t mean that persuasive, reasoned argument is never appropriate. However, what he is saying is wonderfully countercultural, I think, in the context of our present “culture wars.”

Someone who has actually tasted truth is not contentious for truth.

Someone who is considered among men to be zealous for truth has not yet learnt what truth is really like; once he has truly learnt it, he will cease from zealousness on its behalf.

The gift of God and of knowledge of him is not a cause for turmoil and clamour; rather this gift is entirely filled with a peace in which the Spirit, love and humility reside.

The following is a sign of the coming of the Spirit: the person whom the Spirit has overshadowed is made perfect in these very virtues.

God is reality. The person whose mind has become aware of God does not even possess a toungue with which to speak, but God resides in his heart in great serenity. He experiences no stirring of zeal or argumentatitiveness, nor is he stirred by anger. He cannot even be aroused concerning the faith.

I’m sure that many Christians reading the headline of this post would respond positively to it. The culture wars have conditioned us to become excited by battle cries about truth. In our zeal, however, I think we often lose a deeper perspective about what Truth really is, and about what our relationship to Truth must be.

The foundation of Truth is the triune God, and the triune God’s ultimate revelation of Truth to us is the divine logos, God incarnate in Jesus. Our relationship with Jesus is based on his sacrificial death on the cross, made effective to us only by God’s grace. Our aspect concerning Truth must therefore be one of humble gratitude, never one of angry zeal. I think this is what Isaac means when he says “Someone who has actually tasted truth is never contentious for truth.” Like the Apostle Peter cutting off Malchus’ ear (John 18:10), we think we have to defend Jesus with violent words. Nothing could be further from the Truth.

Categories
Epistemology Theology

Bloesch on Truth

This is a continuation of my posts about Donald Bloesch’s Holy Scripture.

Bloesch’s chapter “Truth in Biblical & Philosophical Perspective” is excellent. Bloesch notes that both the correspondence and coherence views of truth are Biblically flawed. “To understand truth bascially in terms of correspondence between the mind and the exterior world,” Bloesch notes, “reflects a dualistic view of reality, presupposing a bifurcation between mind and matter, spirit and nature.” This is a helpful corrective to the strong emphasis in some corners of evangelicalism on the correspondence view (to the point, in the writings of folks like Doug Groothuis, of holding that the correspondence view is the only proper view for a Christian to hold).

The coherence view, Bloesch holds, is equally flawed, because it is rooted in an idealistic monism, in which everything is capable of hanging together perfectly in human speech and thought, and in which nothing is unique or outside a systematizable perspective. Yet Bloesch is similarly critical of mysticism, in which truth is a sort of “overarching unity that dissolves particularity and individuality” and pragmatism, in which “the criterion for truth is workability and utility.”

Against all these views, Bloesch suggests that “truth” in scripture usually means “genuineness, veracity, faithfulness and steadfastness.” “In the deepest sense,” he says, “truth is identified with God himself, and the stamp of truth therefore characterizes both his words and his works. Truth is not so much an ideas as a person, not so much a formulation as an act.”

This does not to suggest to Bloesch that correspondence and coherence are irrelevant. However, while

[t]he Christian certainly shares with the unbeliever the idea of truth as a correct description of the world, . . . the correspondence theory becomes questionable when the discussion turns to ultimate or final truth. Truth in the ultimate sense is not a conforming of the mind to objective reality but the refocusing of the mind by the Spirit of God, who breaks into our reality from the beyond. Truth is being brought into accord with the transcendent meaning of the gospel, the very Word of God. It is not simply an agreement between our ideas and the gospel but a conforming of our totla life orientation to the demands of the gospel. Truth in biblical perspective is not so much the factual of the eventful. It is not the mere perception of facts but transformation by the transcendent reality that the biblical facts point to and attest.

Similarly, the coherence theory eventually breaks down because “[r]evelation cannot be assimilated into a comprehensive, rational system of truth….” However, revelation “can throw light on all human systems that purport to give meaning and purpose to life.” Pragmatism also is misplaced because “the fundamental need of human beings is not satisfaction or integration but deliverance from sin and communion with God.” And mysticism loses contact with Biblical truth because “[f]aith is not a mystical unknowing but a steadfast and certain knowledge concerning things beyond the compass of human reason and imagination (Calvin).”
Bloesch ties all this together in an assessment of evangelical controversies about scripture. He notes, correctly I think, that

The crux of the problem in contemporary evangelicalism concerning the inerrancy of the Bible revolves around different understandings of truth. The conflict is not so much theological as philosophical. Because a large segment of conservative Protestantism has unwittingly accepted the Enlightenment reduction of truth to the rationally empirical or evidential, the possibility of forging some concensus on this question is made all the more difficult. What is clear is that the cultural or dictionary understanding of truth has eclipsed the biblical understanding among many earnest Christians.

Bloesch argues for an understanding of inerrancy that is not freighted with this cultural baggage. “Biblical Christians,” he says, “can affirm the inerrancy of Scripture so long as it is not confused with total factual and scientific accuracy. . . . Inerrancy in biblical understanding means that the Bible in its unity with the Spirit guides us into all truth.”
This does not mean that the essentially historical character of Biblical revelation can be discarded.

The paramount question is not whether the Bible is true in the sense of being fully accurate in everything it reports, but whether the Bible leads us into truth, whether the Bible brings us truth. But the Bible could not lead us into truth unless its central claims were true, unless its overall witness were reliable and dependable. . . . To affirm that the Bible teaches ‘religious truth’ but not ‘historical truth’ is to overlook the Bible’s central claim that paradoxically God became historical, myth became fact.

Ultimately, Bloesch states, “[t]he texts of Scripture are steppingstones to the spiritual reality to which these texts refer, a reality inaccessible to historical research and investigation. God’s Word is truly known only when God himself speaks, an occurrence that is always unpredictable and mind-altering.”

There is so much that I think is helpful and right in this balanced, reformed understanding of truth, which nods to Barth without accepting Barth uncritically.

Categories
Epistemology Science & Technology Theology

Intelligent Design and Positivism

I participate in an email list concerning intelligent design, on which there’s been an interesting discussion about whether ID presupposes a positivist epistemology. I think that it often does.

By “positivism” I mean a philosophical / epistemological position according to which knowledge is authentic only if it is measurable and empirically verifiable — i.e., only if it is derived from the scientific method. See a Wiki here. It seems to me that ID often accepts this assumption by proposing, at least implicitly, that the doctrine of creation is in some sense measurable and emprically verifiable. The presense of specified complex information, for example, is supposed to be a filter through which we can empirically verify the activity of a creator. If not for some concession to positivism, however, why would we even need such an empirical filter?

The Bible says “the heavens declare the glory of God” (Ps. 19), which I take to mean that all of creation reflects God’s glory. God is revealed in all of creation, apart from any specific scientific test we might propose for deducing his activity in some aspect of creation. Indeed, the pursuit of such a particular scientific test is misguided. The test is simply everything that exists.

I think this is different than the question of evidential apologetics. I would disagree with many opponents of ID who suggest that the creation we observe is as compatible with atheism as it is with theism. I think this stance is correct only if we’re back to presupposing a postivitist epistemology. If we presuppose positivism, then I think its correct that the existence of God can’t be “proven” one way or the other. But if the sense of wonder, longing and awe we feel when we reflect on the creation around us is more than some kind of reductionist biological / evolutionary impulse — if, as C.S. Lewis might put it, our experience of the numinous points to a reality outside our ordinary perception — then the positivistic atheist is merely dulling his senses when he denies the creator. As Romans 1 puts it, “their thinking [becomes] futile and their foolish hearts [are] darkened” concerning the knowledge of God.

Therefore, to a mind not entirely bound by a presupposition against the knowledge of God, the “ordinary” processes of creation seem reducible to physical laws and chance. It is only as grace begins to melt that futility and darkness that the evidences we can provide in support of the faith start to make sense. (Unlike very strict Calvinist presuppositionalists, I believe common grace plays an important role here and that glimpses of the numinous aren’t limited to the elect.) But it seems to me that the sorts of evidences we can provide are not taken from the positivist’s toolbox in the form of particular mathematical filters and proofs. They are rather the witness of all of creation, seen through the spectacles of faith. (For a good essay exploring some of these themes, see Michael Hanby, Reclaiming Creation in a Darwinian World, Theology Today 62(2006): 476-83).

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Epistemology Science & Technology

Polanyi on Positivism and the Freedom of Science

Here is Polanyi in his essay “The Nature of Scientific Convictions” on why positivism should not provide the basis for the autonomy of science:

the freedom of science cannot be defended today on the basis of a positivist conception of science, which involves a positivist program for the ordering of society. Totalitarianism is a much truer embodiment of such a program than is the free society; as, indeed, consistent positivism must destroy the free society. A complete causal interpretation of man and human affairs disintegrates all rational grounds for men’s convictions and actions. It leaves you with a picture of human affairs construed in terms of appetites checked only by fear. All you have to explain then in order to understand history, and with it politics, law, science, music, etc., is why at certain moments the appetite of one group gets the upper hand over its rivals. (Reprinted in Scientific Thought and Social Reality, at p. 64.)

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Epistemology Science & Technology

Polanyi on Scientific Materialism

I’ve finally made some time to read Michael Polanyi in more detail. Here is Polanyi on scientific materialism, from the essay “Science and the Modern Crisis” in Scientific Thought and Social Reality (he is speaking here particularly about Marxism):

When our intellect convinces us, backed by the authority of science, that our morality is pointless, and teaches us that we can achieve everything to which morality aspires merely by letting loose our animal forces – then our morality is converted into scientific bestiality. That is the picture of the modern fanatic, the modern party man; aloof, and supremely confident of possessing a superior knowledge of reality; cruel and unscrupulous; merciless torture and death.

Categories
Epistemology Science & Technology

Science and Interpretation

Phillip Clayton’s fascinating article The Fall from Objectivity: How Interpretation Entered into the (Scientific) World…And What It Means for Religion on Metanexus discusses the different types of hermeneutics involved in natural science, social science, literary criticism, and religion. Clayton notes that

just as the positivists were declaring empirical verifiability to be the only criterion of meaning, Toulmin, Hanson and Kuhn were already urging the incommensurability of competing paradigms; just as the human genome project was laying bare the very building blocks of the human machine, the 30,000+ genes that alone must code for all inherited human structures and behaviors, leading biologists were already describing the irreducible role of epigenetic factors and top-down causation in regulating genetic expression; and just as sociology and economics were setting undreamed-of standards for quantitative precision in social science, anthropology and the interpretive sciences were already declaring “no exit” from the hermeneutical blocks to objective knowledge of the Other. To the innocent observer, it certainly appears that the project of omni-reduction to scientific explanation collapsed, perhaps permanently, at what should have been its moment of greatest victory.

Yet, Clayton argues, identity theorists have gone too far in reducing all scientific truth claims (indeed all truth claims) to mere interpretation. Clayton observes:

But where the Identity Theorist sees an identity, I see a series of distinct types of human inquiry. Yes, interpretation is ubiquitous; but the role it plays varies. The human subject is always involved, but it’s not always involved in the same way. Here’s the core difference, which I owe to Anthony Giddens: the natural scientist is engaged in a process of interpreting a field of data, of seeing it as a certain way; and she partially constructs the world she sees. But the human scientist – the psychologist, sociologist or anthropologist – is involved not just in this single hermeneutic but in a “double hermeneutic.” In these three “human sciences” at least, both the inquirer and the object of inquiry are interpreting subjects. Here questions of interpretation are inescapable in an even more radical fashion than in the natural sciences, since the subject being interpreted is also imposing her own meaning on the situation.

I’m not sure I fully agree with Clayton’s conclusion, but it’s a fascinating essay.

Categories
Epistemology

Alister McGrath on Faith and Certainty

I appreciate Alister McGrath’s work deeply. For those who don’t know of him, McGrath is a prominent British Evangelical who teaches at Oxford University and holds doctorates in biology and theology from Oxford. Here is a preview of McGrath’s forthcoming book titled “Doubting.” McGrath notes that

Deep within all of us lies a longing for absolute security, to be able to know with absolute certainty. We feel that we should be absolutely sure of everything that we believe. Surely, we feel, we ought to be able to prove everything that we believe.

And yet, he observes,

The beliefs which are really important in life concern such things as whether there is a God and what he is like, or the mystery of human nature and destiny. These—and a whole host of other important beliefs—have two basic features. In the first place, they are relevant to life. They matter, in that they affect the way in which we think, live, hope and act. In the second place, they cannot be proved (or disproved) with total certainty. ,,,
To believe in God demands an act of faith—as does the decision not to believe in him. Neither is based upon absolute certainty, nor can they be. To accept Jesus demands a leap of faith—but so does the decision to reject him. To accept Christianity demands faith—and so does the decision to reject it. Both rest upon faith, in that nobody can prove with absolute certainty that Jesus is the Son of God, the risen saviour of humanity—just as nobody can prove with absolute certainty that he is not.

But our faith isn’t blind or irrational. As McGrath notes

There is indeed a leap of faith involved in Christianity—but it is not an irrational leap into the dark. The Christian experience is that of being caught safely by a loving and living God, whose arms await us as we leap. Martin Luther put this rather well: “Faith is a free surrender and a joyous wager on the unseen, untried and unknown goodness of God.”

This is one I’ll definitely add to my Amazon wishlist.

Categories
Epistemology

Certainty, Certitude, Epistemology and Apologetics

Jeff and I have been having a good discussion about apologetics and certainty. I want to pick up on that discussion here.

As I’ve thought this through and read through some materials, I think one of the key issues for me is what we mean by “certainty.” I believe we should make a distinction between certainty and certitude or assurance. This distinction is helpfully made by the late Paul Feinberg (a former professor at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School) in his essay on Cumulative Case Apologetics in the book Five Views on Apologetics. Here is what Feinberg said:

Many apologists distinguish between certainty and certitude. Certainty looks at the strength of the external evidence for a belief. Certitude looks beyond the external evidence, recognizing that there is a subjective element which can alone explain the tenacity and stubbornness of belief. This stubbornness is not the result of ignorance or stupidity; it is the work of the Holy Spirit.

Feinberg elaborates on this point in a footnote as follows:

Nash makes well the point that I am trying to make here. He points out that because worldviews are about reality, we can never have logical certainty. Evidence for interpretations of reality can only have probability or plausibility as I have called it. Nash points out that some have taken this lack of logical certainty to be a sacrilege. He counters this claim that we can and often do believe matters that lack logical certainty with moral or psychological certainty. I have called this certitude to distinguish it from certainty. It is subjective, and it is the work of the Holy Spirit.

Feinberg touches on the heart of my issue with the term “certainty”: in my experience, all too often, logical or evidential apologetic arguments advanced by Christians are less than convincing. I do believe that there are a number of quite convincing logical and evidential arguments in favor of Christianity, but even these are not indubitably correct. There are any number of points at which even the best logical and evidential arguments could fail, even if the likelihood of such failure seems passingly small. And, there are a number of important questions, many dealing with the relationship between scripture and science, that simply are not resolveable given our present state of knowledge.

I am in agreement, then, with the presuppositionalist view that certitude or assurance is an internal work of the Holy Spirit. However, I do not think there is no role for external logical and historical evidence that can be ascertainable in some sense even to unregenerate people. On this point, I like Feinberg’s cumulative case approach, which sums various arguments to propose an overall case in favor of belief. Perhaps I like Feinberg’s approach because it essentially what we lawyers do when we present a case to a judge or jury.

Categories
Epistemology

Evidentialism, Presuppositionalism, and Certainty

My buddy Jeff points out This Article on “certainty” by reformed professor Dr. John Frame. Frame is a “presuppositionalist” — according to his Wikipedia entry, he’s one of the foremost interpreters of Cornelius Van Til. There are certain aspects of presuppositionalism that I find very appealing. However, I think I’m more of an evidentialist, or at least something of a Thomist when it comes to natural law. (For the distinction between presuppositionalism and evidentialism, see this adequate but thin Wiki. Anyway, the Frame article raised some interesting questions on one of my favorite subjects — epistemology and Christian faith — and here are my thoughts.

Categories
Epistemology

Foundationalist Ontology, Nonfoundationalist Epistemology

There’s an interesting article in this month’s First Things by theologian R.R. Reno titled “Theolgy’s Continental Captivity.” Reno reviews a systematic theology text by Catholic theologian Thomas Guarino, which takes up the problem of non-foundationalist theology. Reno makes a compelling distinction, I think, between non-foundationalist ontology and non-foundationalist epistemology.

Non-foundationalist ontology is the sort of non-foundationalism held by the Continental postmodern philosophers. When many of us hear the term “postmodernism,” this is what we conjure. This is the view that there is no “Truth,” but rather there are only linguistic constructs. Reno correctly argues that this sort of non-foundationalism is inimical to Christian notions of Truth.

As Christians, we are ontological foundationalists. We believe there is such a thing as Reality outside our linguistic and social constructs, and that Reality ultimately is grounded in God. Therefore, we believe there is such a thing as “objective” Truth.

There is a difference, however, between the fact of Reality and the extent to which we as human beings can perceive, comprehend and make true statements about Reality. Here, Reno refers helpfully to W.V. Quine.