There’s an interesting article in this month’s First Things by theologian R.R. Reno titled “Theolgy’s Continental Captivity.” Reno reviews a systematic theology text by Catholic theologian Thomas Guarino, which takes up the problem of non-foundationalist theology. Reno makes a compelling distinction, I think, between non-foundationalist ontology and non-foundationalist epistemology.
Non-foundationalist ontology is the sort of non-foundationalism held by the Continental postmodern philosophers. When many of us hear the term “postmodernism,” this is what we conjure. This is the view that there is no “Truth,” but rather there are only linguistic constructs. Reno correctly argues that this sort of non-foundationalism is inimical to Christian notions of Truth.
As Christians, we are ontological foundationalists. We believe there is such a thing as Reality outside our linguistic and social constructs, and that Reality ultimately is grounded in God. Therefore, we believe there is such a thing as “objective” Truth.
There is a difference, however, between the fact of Reality and the extent to which we as human beings can perceive, comprehend and make true statements about Reality. Here, Reno refers helpfully to W.V. Quine.
Quine, Reno says,
distinguished between epistemology and ontology. How can we verify or prove what we know is different from what we can with confidence say about the nature of the mind, the world and truth. This allowed Qunie to be modestly skeptical about the capacity of philosophy to say helpful things about how we know. But in the realm of ontology (broadly understood as inquiry into the way things are) he went on to initiate an extraordinary period of creativity.
In fact, the two arelinked, for the foundationalist project in epistemology (of which Logical Positivism was but one particularly vigorous form) had a tendency to confuse truth with certainty, and this greatly constrained the scope of philosophy. Thus, Quine was a nonfoundationalist with respect to epistemology, but he certainly did not think that truth was socially constructed, or that the universality of scientific teaching entails an oppressive suppression of difference, or that logic is an expression of the will-to-power.
Reno goes on to discuss the development of analytic philosophy after Quine, and expresses his belief that analytic philosophy holds more promise as a mode of theological thought than Continental postmodernism. As Reno notes, neither Quine nor most contemporary analytic philosphers are close friends of Christianity or theism. However, I think Reno makes some excellent points about how the insights of analytic philosophy can help Christian thinkers develop a robust defense of Truth in postmodern times. In particular, this Quineian distinction between foundationalism in ontology and non-foundationalism in epistemology is helpful for those of us who are interested in how Christian theology and missiology should interact with postmodern thought and culture.