I’ve been participating in a conversation about the Emerging Church and epsitemology, one of my favorite subjects, at Vos Regnum Dei. The text of the conversation thus far is below. Some good stuff to chew over.
Category: Epistemology
The Blind Men and the Elephant
I heard a sermon today that featured a discussion of truth. The speaker was from a conservative evangelical tradition and was making a very basic comparison of absolute truth versus relativism. He referred to the parable of the blind men and the elephant as a standard relativist’s argument and tried to show how the parable fails as an argument for relativism. The elephant, after all, remains an elephant, regardless of the inaccurate perceptions of the blind men. This is a good critique, but in many ways I think it misses the point of the parable. In the process, some potentially helpful observations about truth and knowledge went by the boards.
Reading 1 Timothy this morning, I was struck by the first century hymn quoted by Paul at the end of chapter 3. The hymn follows Paul’s instructions concerning the appointment of overseers (elders) and deacons. Paul notes that he hopes to give these instructions in person, but that he is “writing you these instructions so that, if I am delayed, you will know how people ought to conduct themselves in God’s household, which is the church of the living God, the pillar and foundation of the truth.” (1 Tim. 3:14-15.)
I never noticed before what an amazing ecclesiological passage this is. It seems to pull together much of the reading and scribbling I’ve been doing over the past year about truth and epistemology. Paul says the church, the community of God’s people, is “the pillar and foundation of the truth.” This is what seems to be missing in much of our hyper-individualist evangelical culture. Perhaps in some ways it’s a sour fruit of the Reformation. We need to regain an understanding of the community of faith as “the pillar and foundation of the truth.”
Now, on to the hymn. After his ecclesiological statement, Paul concludes that, “[b]eyond all question, the mystery of godliness is great,” and then quotes this Christological hymn:
He appeared in a body,
was vindicated by the Spirit,
was seen by angels;
was preached among the nations,
was believed on in the world,
was taken up in glory.
How I wish I could sit in one of those first century house churches and sing this hymn with that first generation of believers who composed it! And yet I can — the Christological hymn naturally follows Paul’s ecclesiological statement about truth because Christ is the head of the Church. When I proclaim the truth of Christ in the community of God’s people gathered together in a particular time and place, I become part of the pillar of truth extending back through the first century to the Church’s founding at Pentecost. This is an incredible mystery to celebrate.
Joe Carter compares “postmodernism” with Nigel Tufnel’s Amp (in the parody “This is Spinal Tap”) that goes to “11” — the point being that “postmodernism” is illusory and merely represents a “hyped up” modernity. Since I’m a guitar player, a Spinal Tap fan, and at least a casual student of the “emergent” movement, the analogy intruiged me.
My initial thought was that “postmodernism” is illusory if you define it to be so, just as “11” on a guitar amp is illusory if you define it as “10” by a different symbol. If you define “postmodernism” more precisely, however, it isn’t illusory at all. There certainly is meat to critiques of foundationalist epistemology, for example, whether or not you ultimately agree with those critiques.
Likewise, an amp that dials to “11” may well be different than an amp that uses the traditional limit of “10.” In fact, “10” doesn’t represent a fixed volume, tone or wattage; a 1970 100 watt Marshall head driving a 4×4 stack of vintage Celestions at “10,” for example, will pump out more decibles at different timbres than, say, a 15 watt Gibson tweed combo on “10”. So “11,” in a given context for a given amp, could have meaning.
My effort to frame this thought, however, isn’t nearly as eloquent as Peter Epps’ brilliant comment to Joe’s post. As Peter concludes, “[t]he postmodernist sets the amp at eleven, and enjoys the show.”
I hope Peter can forgive me for reproducing his comment in full in the extended entry below.
Joe Carter at Evangelical Outpost posts some interesting thoughts about the criteria for evaluating worldviews, which provoked the flurry of comments (over 220!) that seems typical for Joe’s site. Ultimately this is all about epistemology, and I’m not quite sure about Norman Geisler’s “undeniability” criteria referenced in Joe’s post. Actually, I am fairly sure about it — it doesn’t make much sense to me, because certain things are “undeniable” only if you approach them based on assumptions that are not undeniable. It’s that whole foundationalism / infinite regress problem again.
But what I really wonder is whether all this energy spent on justifying our “worldview” is misplaced. I don’t name a “worldview” as Lord. I name Jesus as Lord. Jesus didn’t commission me to argue with people about my “worldview.” He commissioned me to introduce people to him so that they could become his disciples. In other words, it’s not about the system of thought I’ve built up around the truths of Christianity. It’s about a relationship with Christ.
This isn’t to discount the importance of ideas or the need to bring Christian truth to bear in the public square. In fact, much of my working energy is devoted to those very things. But it seems to me that there’s a dangerous shift afoot. Not long ago, Evangelicals had to be coaxed into the public square. Now, we’re there with a vengance — sometimes literally with a vengance. It seems we’re sometimes more interested in making arguments about politics and policy than in bringing people to the savior.
The utlimate justification for our “worldview” isn’t “undeniability” or any other epistemic criteria. It’s Christ. Some things we “know” only because we’ve been called into a relationship with Christ. If our principal focus is “worldviews” rather than Christ, we will miss the boat.
Schiavo and Judicial Activism
I was listening to the Sean Hannity show on my way into the office this afternoon. He was discussing the Florida District Court’s ruling denying the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order under the federal statute passed by Congress (the “Schiavo Act”). Hannity stated that he believed the court’s opinion did not even reference the Schiavo Act. He was hammering the federal court’s decision as symptomatic of the arrogance of the judiciary. Senator Rick Santorum came on the Hannity show and claimed the Schiavo Act required the federal court to order the reinsertion of nutrition and hydration tubes pending a full hearing on the merits. Santorum also decried the ruling as an abuse of judicial power. This seems to be the Christian Right’s theme: a National Right to Life Committee spokesman referred to the federal court’s decision as a “gross abuse of judicial power”; Christian Defense Coalition Director Pat Mahoney, quoted in a Focus on the Family article, attributed the federal court’s decision to “an arrogant and activist federal judiciary.”
Unfortunately, all of these comments about judicial activism are wrong.
Foundationalism and theTrinity
My post about Nancy Pearcy’s book Total Truth led to some good discussion about the limits of logic. In particular, there was some discussion about whether the doctrine of the Trinity is “logical.” To me, the doctrine of the Trinity is a severe test for any kind of foundationalism in which human reason and perception are considered basic.
It seems to me that the doctrine of the Trinity fails the test of human logic, and therefore should not be considered a legitimate belief by a foundationalist. Of course, as a Christian, I, along with most if not all of my foundationalist Evangelical friends, do believe in the doctrine of the Trinity. So what I’d like to do is explore a bit of my thinking on this, and invite my friends in the blogsphere who’ve been defending at least a “modest” foundationalism to explain how their criteria for truth square with believing the doctrine of the Trinity. (As usual, I don’t claim to know it all here, and I’m in the process of exploring these thoughts myself.)
Apologetics and Soft Foundationalism
A number of bloggers are raising alarms about the Emergent movement, including Phil Steiger, Greg Koukul, Dignan and Jeff at Dawn Treader.
I share many of the concerns these folks have raised. It may not be clear from my site, but I’m not really an “Emergent” guy. I’m soundly Evangelical in my theology. Yet, I do feel great empathy with much in the Emergent movement, because much of it is a needed corrective for the stagnation that now exists in Evangelicaldom. I hope Evangelicals in the blogshpere don’t make “Emergent” the new whipping boy. That would betray a lack of real understanding of the movement.
I note, for example, that most of the posts I referenced essentially are critiques of Brian McLaren. Folks, Brian McLaren is not the sole voice of Emergent! He is indeed a leader of the movement, and although he isn’t a theologian, where he has touched on doctrinal matters, he can indeed justifiably be criticized for a tendency towards universalism.
Universalism and moral relativism, however, don’t have to be synonymous with a postmodern, non-foundationalist epistemology. If you want to understand more deeply why the Evangelical church must escape foundationalism — even the so-called “soft foundationalism” many propose — please, please read Newbiggin, Raschke, Murphey, Grenz and Franke before deciding Emergent is the next great plague. If you’re not willing to read the challenging stuff these folks have written, don’t comment on postmodern Evangelical theology, because you don’t really understand it. If you have read them, address what they’ve said, not only what McLaren has distilled from them.
Proper Confidence
I’ve just finished reading Lesslie Newbigin’s Proper Confidence (Faith, Doubt & Certainty in Christian Discipleship). I reccomend it to anyone interested in how postmodern epistemology and Christian thought can or should interface.
I particularly appreciated Newbigin’s critique of the critical principle in Carteisan rationalism. As Newbigin succinctly defines it, the critical principle is that “[e]very truth claim must be open to criticism.” (Proper Confidence at p. 23.) He notes that this principle is self-refuting because it rests on its own presuppositional faith commitment: that all valid truth claims can ultimately be proven or disproven. The critical principle, in Newbigin’s view, should be secondary: “[t]he capacity to doubt, to question what seems obvious, is a necessary element in our effort toknow reality as it is, but its role is derivative and secondary. Rational doubt depends on faith; rational faith does not depend on doubt.” (Proper Confidence, at p. 25.) I agree with these conclusions, and I think they’re an important part of why we Evangelicals must reevaluate our commitment to rationalist foundationalism. Ultimately, as Newbigin concludes, rationalist foundationalism leads to extreme skepticism and nihlism, because nothing can be “proven” apart from any faith commitments.
Is it Wrong to Torture Babies?
The Evangelical Outpost contains a thought provoking post on the emergent conversation and “absolute moral truth.” I believe, as the author does, that certain ethical / moral principles are applicable to everyone and not merely a matter of subjective preferences. However, I think the argument raised in the Evangelical Outpost article sets up a straw man by defining “postmodern” or “emergent” Christians too broadly. I also think it muddies the waters by ignoring the ontological presuppositions that underlie ethical / moral statements.
As to my first point, many Christians who are serious about relating postmodern epistemology to theology would decidedly not accept the premise that the are no universally applicable ethical norms. While it’s true that many who call themselves “emergent” blindly accept the relativism inherent in much postmodern thought, for the most part, such people tend not to be the emergent conversations true theological thought leaders.
Take Nancey Murphy’s book Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, for example. Murphy shows how a foundationalist epistemology is inadequate, and how much language concerning “absolute” truth claims is based on foundationalist epistemology. She discusses the postmodern epistemological metaphor of truth as a “web” rather than a building with a foundation, and how relativism can be avoided in a web-based view of truth. Or look at Leslie Newbigin’s Proper Confidence, and again, you’ll see a very thoughtful effort to place Christian truth claims in a nonfoundationalist context without any hint of relativism.
I think when many Christians who take criticisms of foundationalism and language theory seriously hear “absolute” as a qualifier of “truth,” it raises red flags because it sounds as though the speaker is saying “I am making a statement that completely, perfectly absolutely corresponds to reality” — meaning the speaker is able to completely, perfectly, and absolutely apprehend everything God is and communicate that completely, perfectly, and absolutely in human language — when human perception and language seem manifestly inadequate for such a task.
As to my second point, the Evangelical Outpost article uses the statement “it is wrong to torture babies” as a challeng for those who would argue there is no “absolute moral truth.” However, this is an ethical statement based on several presuppositional ontological beliefs concerning the nature of adult and infant human beings (e.g., all human beings, adult or infant, have intrinsic worth, separate wills, and inalienable rights that would make it unethical for an adult to torture an infant). The ethical statement is only “true” if our ontological presuppositions about adult and infant human beings are true. As I see it, it’s impossible to prove those presuppositions are true. In that sense, then, the statement “it is wrong to torture babies” is not an absolute statement; it is contingent on some presuppositions that ultimately are based on faith.
This isn’t to say, of course, that it might be ok to torture babies. Given this understanding of the ethical statement “it is wrong to torture babies,” I think a post-foundationalist epistemological framework actually provides greater force to the ethical statement. Under a foundationalist epistemology, I cannot demonstrate by reason alone that my ontological presuppositions about human nature are true, and therefore I’m left with little else but subjective preferences. Under a post-foundationalist epistemology, the final arbiter is not necessarily only that which is subject to rationalistic “proof.” The natural sense all people exhibit against torturing infants supports the Christian faith claim that all people are made in the image of God and therefore possess intrinsic worth. The ethical claim is then grounded in revelation as well as reason. The “objective” content of the statement is a faith-based ontological claim, which is a perfectly valid basis for the statement, and which applies universally to all people to the extent the ontological faith claim corresponds to reality.
I’m by no means a committed “emergent” person, whatever that would mean, but I do think some of the post-foundationalist theology that’s being done is quite valuable and that arguments about “absolute moral truth” often aren’t much more than sloganeering. I hope we Evangelicals can be more serious about post-foundationalist epistemology and language theory without the knee-jerk reaction “but what about ‘absolute moral truth.'” I also hope emergent Christians can be more serious about the validity of ethical claims without the knee-jerk “who sez” reaction of the postmodern culture at large.